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PROPERTY
by
James H. Wallenstein*

T HIS

Survey Article incorporates several changes in format from the
Property Articles in past Surveys. First, in considering the wealth of potential discussion topics and the obvious limitations of space, the author has
elected to emphasize those topics which relate most directly to real property
concepts and practice. For example, this Article chronicles the advancing
procession of federal land use controls' (even though the full legal impact
of such controls will not be felt until after the close of the survey year),
while cases involving the law of personal property are relegated to scant
mention in the final section. On the other hand, real property topics which
constitute major portions of other Articles in this Survey issue are omitted
entirely from this Article. 2 Finally, the internal structure of this Article has
been altered from that of prior years in an attempt to achieve a functional
sequence and to shift the emphasis of the Article from case summaries to
substantive analysis.
I.

STATUS OF TITLE

Ownership and Boundary Disputes. Ownership and boundary litigation

generally evolves around one or more of the recognized proofs of title: proof
of a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign of the land to one of
the litigants; proof of a superior title in one litigant traced from a common
source acknowledged by both litigants; proof of adverse possession by one
litigant for the applicable limitations period prescribed by statute; and, if
neither litigant can prove superior title by one of the first three methods,
proof of one litigant's prior possession combined with proof that such possession has not been abandoned. 3 The third proof, adverse possession, produced more cases during the survey year than any other. Most of those
cases merely reflect the familiar rule that "the question of adverse possession
is essentially a question of fact"; 4 however, a few interesting legal issues
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. See section IV of this Article, beginning at note 178 infra.
2. For example: homestead and community property, McKnight, Matrimonial
Property; mineral rights, Chappel, Oil and Gas; ad valorem taxes, Tracy, Taxation.

3. Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1964); see Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 364
(1966). For an analysis of the fourth proof, actually merely a presumption which may
be rebutted, see Reiter v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 382 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.
1964).

But see Atchley v. Superior Oil Co., 482 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-

mont 1972), error ref. n.r.e., for a discussion of "juridical possession," a judicial presumption which permits a possessor to claim absolute title against a state vacancy
claim, notwithstanding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5517 (1958), which denies the
defense of adverse possession in claims by the state.
4. West v. Plantation Hills, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1973).

See also Vaughan v. Anderson, 495 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Texarkana 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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were discussed. In Dorbandt v. Jones5 the court held that the prescription
in the ten-year statute of limitations for "cultivating, using or enjoying" the
property to which title by adverse possession was claimed 6 did not require
putting the land to its highest and best use, which the court and the un-

successful litigant assumed to be "recreational" use.

The court instead de-

termined that any use, in this case grazing and fishing, which showed "an
assertion of exclusive ownership ' 7 would satisfy the statutory requirement.
In Pirtle v. Henrys the court stated that a quitclaim deed did not satisfy
the requirement of a "deed or deeds, or any instrument or instruments, purporting to convey [the property in question]," prescribed as a necessary
element to proof of title under the twenty-five-year statute of limitations.P
Unfortunately, although the court's statement may 'be supported by the single source of authority which it cited, 10 it ignored a controversial and relevant 1965 decision by the Supreme Court of Texas, Porter v. Wilson,1
which held a quitclaim deed to be inadequate under the five-year statute
of limitations.' 2 To be sure, the statement in Pirtle may 'be a valid extension of the supreme court's prior decision; however, a different conclusion
could have been reached in light of the distinguishable language of the twenty-five-year statute and the five-year statute,' 3 the intense three-man dissent in Porter,14 the critical academic response to that decision,' 5 and the
fact that possession for an additional twenty years (over the five-year statute's required possession) may logically permit a reduction in the strict requirement of Porter.
5. 492 S.W.2d 601 (Tex, Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
6. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ait. 5510 (1958).
7. Of course, the extent of grazing or fishing may not always be sufficient to
prove adverse possession. See Georgetown Builders, Inc. v. Heirs of John Tanksley,
498 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e. See also Comment,
Seasonal Use of Land for Business Purposes as Regards Quality of Adverse Possession, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 217 (1969).
8. 486 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
9. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5519 (Supp. 1973).
10. 19 TEX. JUR. 2D Deeds § 11 (1960). The court's statement is, perhaps, further
supported by TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962), which incorporates the concept of warranty into the terms "grant" and "convey." See also Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961), which, by failing to
mention the factual situation in the instant case in an analysis of article 5519, may
constitute tacit support for the rationale employed by the court.
11. 389 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1965).
12. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (1958).
13. Article 5509 requires the adverse possessor to be "claiming under a deed or
deeds duly registered" whereas article 5519 requires "a deed or deeds, or any instrument
or instruments, purporting to convey the same" (emphasis added). As pointed out in
Note, An Instrument Which Conveys Only the Grantor's Right in the Land is a Quitclaim and Will Not Support the Five-Year Statute of Limitations, 43 TExAs L. REV.
1129 (1965), Texas courts interpreting article 5509 have, often implicitly, distinguished
"conveyance of land" instruments from "purported conveyance" instruments. Although
the latter were not deemed adequate with regard to article 5509, they would appear
to have greater applicability with regard to article 5519.
14. The dissent relied on a prior line of cases which appear to be in conflict with
the majority opinion. See Parker v. Newberry, 83 Tex. 428, 18 S.W. 815 (1892), and
Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923), holding approved.
15. Note, supra note 13; Note, Article 5509 and the Quitclaim Deed, 17 BAYLOR
L. REV. 233 (1965). See also Larson, Limitations on Actions for Real Property: the
Texas Five-Year Statute, 18 Sw. L.J, 385, 395 (1964), which was cited favorably by
the dissent in Porter. 389 S.W.2d at 666 n.3.
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In a case involving a plaintiff's attempt to prove a regular chain of title
from the sovereign, Jeffus v. Coon,16 the court accepted the offered proof
despite a missing link in the chain between April 5, 1857, and December
18, 1877. The court's decision was founded on two determinations: first,
the facts proven at trial, which established strong circumstantial evidence of
the existence-and loss during that twenty-year period-of a deed which
would have restored the sequence of the chain; and second, the legal doctrine of "presumption of a grant," which is often used to justify the court's
acceptance of proof of title despite a missing link. Although not essential
to the holding of this case, the opinion perhaps demonstrates that courts are
being less than precise in their use of the term "presumption of a .grant."
At one point in the opinion, for example, the court explained the presumption as follows: "[W]here there is a missing link in the chain of title many
years prior to time such issue is raised, there is a presumption liberally indulged that a deed did exist covering the period."'1 7 However, in the next
paragraph of the opinion the court quoted with approval the following statement from a 1956 opinion by the Supreme Court of Texas: "A case of
presumed grant is not made merely by proof of long, adverse claim of
ownership and proof of nonclaim on the part of the apparent owner. There
must be evidence proving or tending to prove acquiescence by the apparent
owner in the claim of the adverse party."' 8 Admittedly, the latter statement
was originally pronounced in a case involving only the proof of adverse possession; however, it does seem to be closer than the former statement to
complying with the checklist established by the supreme court in 1920 for
determining whether circumstantial evidence warrants a "presumption of a
grant."' 1 Perhaps, as the supreme court has already indicated, the term
"presumption of a grant" should be replaced with a term less vulnerable to
obfuscation, such as "proof of title by circumstantial evidence," 20 a term
16. 484 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
17. Id. at 953. The emphasis on the word "liberally" in that statement is found
not only in Jeffus, but also in Oswald v. Staton, 421 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1967), error ref. n.r.e. See also Ballingall v. Brown, 226 S.W.2d 165, 171
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950), error ref. n.r.e.
18. Adams v. Slattery, 156 Tex. 433, 448, 295 S.W.2d 859, 868 (1956), which in
turn quoted Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 151-52, 166 S.W.2d 81, 89 (1942).
19. In Magee v. Paul, 110 Tex. 470, 478, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (1920), the supreme
court listed the requirements as follows: "first, of a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; second, of nonclairn by the apparent owner; and
third, of acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim." This checklist was
quoted and approved in Adams v. Slattery, 156 Tex. 433, 447-48, 295 S.W.2d 859, 868
(1956). Although the passage of time is certainly the primary element in the Magee
checklist, considerations such as the "adverse" nature of the claim and the apparent
owner's "acquiescence" indicate that other factual elements must be considered before
a presumption is established. Cf. Sulphen v. Norris, 44 Tex. 204 (1875), discussed
in Cadena, The Pyramiding of Presumptions and Inferences in Texas, 4 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1, 13-14 (1972).
20. Quoting again from Adams v. Slattery: "The rule is generally referred to as
the presumption of a deed or grant, but it seems to us it could be more accurately
termed proof of title by circumstantial evidence," 156 Tex. at 448, 295 S.W.2d at 868,
quoting Love v. Eastham, 137 Tex. 462, 467, 154 S.W.2d 623, 625 (1941). See also
Comment, Proof of a Deed by Circumstantial Evidence, 20 BAYLOR L. Rav. 167, 16869 ('1968): "The presumption of a grant .....
[and similar terms] are all misleading
terms which have been used to describe what is actually proof of a conveyance by circumstantial evidence."
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which was given only terse reference in Jeffus.
In Mortgage Investment Co. v. Bauer2' the proof and accuracy of a survey was in issue due to a conflict between the calls for course and distance
and a call adjoining two contiguous survey tracts. In affirming the award
of acreage to the plaintiff, who was defending the call for adjoinder, the
court not only restated the general rule which gives a call for adjoinder priority over a call for course and distance 22 but also gave priority to that rule
itself over another rule of conflict resolution which the defendant had ad23
vanced.
A few cases during the survey year involved the doctrine of constructive
trust, the equitable attack on record title which is often used when a record
holder has violated a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in connection with the
acquisition of title to property.2 4 In two of these cases the courts rewarded
naivet6 by finding a fiduciary relationship, and thus establishing a constructive trust. 25 However, the supreme court in Tyra v. Woodson 26 was unimpressed by the plight of two businessmen who thought they were members
of a joint venture to acquire certain oil and gas leases. The plaintiffs explained their lack of a written agreement by testifying that the defendants
had lulled them into complacency with protests of integrity. 27 The supreme
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, and restated its 1966 summary of the
law in Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. of America v. Thompson: "Our
holdings above cited are to the effect that for a constructive trust to arise
there must be a fiduciary relationship before, and apart from, the agreement
28
made the basis of the suit."
The statutory method for resolving ownership and boundary disputes in
21. 493 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
22. See 9 TEX. JuR. 2D Boundaries § 29 (1969). For this and other boundary resolution rules reviewed during the past year, see United States v. Champion Papers, Inc.,
361 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

23. The other rule, espoused in two earlier cases, had emphasized the respective
dates of award, holding that the junior award must yield to the senior award. Allen
v. Draper, 254 S.W. 783, holding approved, modified, 256 S.W. 255 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1923); Post v. Draper, 205 S.W. 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918), error
dismissed.

24. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 482 (2d ed. 1960); 1 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS
§ 44.2 (3d ed. 1967); Olds, Oral Trusts of Land for Grantor-Restitution,6 HOUSTON
L. Rav. 113 (1968); Comment, Constructive Trust in Texas, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 59
(1969). The doctrine is actually invoked in order to avoid the requirement of a written agreement by the defendant, which would otherwise be required by the Statute of
Frauds. See Tax. Bus. & COMM. CoaE ANN. § 26.01 (1968); TEX. REV. Cv. STAT.
ANN. art. 7425b-7 (1960).
25. Dixon v. Huggins, 495 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error dismissed (evidence showed that deeds to brother by his brothers and sisters were made
as an accommodation to him in order to permit him to obtain government crop loans);
Tuck v. Miller, 483 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (evidence showed that the defendant courted the confidences of the plaintiff and her husband, and agreed that he would take title only to secure him for his expenses and services).
26. 495 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1973); see Comment, Tyra v. Woodson: Breach of a
FiduciaryRelationship and the Constructive Trust, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 91 (1974).
27. One plaintiff testified that, upon being asked about a written contract, one of
the defendants replied:

"If you can't trust anybody you are in business with, you

should not be in business with them in the first place." 495 S.W.2d at 213.
,28. 405 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. 1966). For a critique of this principle see Olds,
supra note 24, at 126.
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Texas is by action of trespass to try title, 29 and most status-of-title cases reported in this section involved that form of action. Moreover, a few cases
were decided on issues relating to the action itself. In three instances the
successful litigants in a previous action of trespass to try title were later denied title in subsequent judicial contests. In these three cases the victorious
parties in the previous litigation, respectively, had possibly perpetrated a
fraud,30 had been merely a co-defendant of the adverse party in the instant
case,31 and had sued the present adversaries' predecessor after record title
had passed to the adversaries themselves.3 2 Finally, in two cases bringing
into question the standing of a plaintiff to institute an action for trespass
to try title, the same court in different decisions held that a purchaser holding merely a land contract instead of a deed, the procedure used under
the Texas Veteran's Land Program,83 had equitable title and therefore could
institute such an action,3 4 but that a lienholder had only an equitable right
35
and therefore had no standing to sue.
Easement and Other Rights. Although not necessarily imbued with novel
legal doctrines, three cases decided during the survey year should be reviewed by all attorneys whose clients are buying recreational lots in waterfront subdivisions. 86 In all three cases the lot owners were successful in enforcing their easements of access and waterfront enjoyment, and in one of
the cases the court upheld a mandatory injunction for the removal of a residence built in violation of the lot owners' easements. 87 However, the very
existence of litigation should cause the potential lot purchaser to review carefully the legal documentation for all publicized waterfront benefits appurtenant to his land.
In two other cases involving easement allegations, the claimants were unsuccessful. In Pollard v. State8 8 the State of Texas in 1959 had purchased
29. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7364 (1960); TEX. R. Civ. P. 783. Of course,
not all ownership cases can be resolved in a trespass to try title action. See, e.g., Tolle
v. Sawtelle, 246 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952), error ref. (trespass
to try title is the wrong action for proving a constructive or resulting trust).
30. Crow v. Crow, 485 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), mentioned in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 35
(1973).
31. United States v. 115.27 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. Gray v. Joyce, 485 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
33. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m (Supp. 1974).
34. Venable v. Patti, 490 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error
ref. n.r.e.
35. Texas W. Financial Corp. v. Cochran, 488 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error ref. n.r.e. The court did discuss the possibility of other actions
which would have been accepted, such as a suit for cancellation, rescission, or reformation of a deed or deeds; however, it did not see fit to remand the case to the trial
court for a review of such possibilities. See also Tolle v. Sawtelle, 246 S.W.2d 916,
920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952), error ref.
36. Coleman v. Forister, 497 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error
granted (Bee Creek, Travis County); Anderson v. McRae, 495 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1973) (Brooks Lake, Wood County); Austin Lake Estates Recreation
Club, Inc. v. Gilliam, 493 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
(Lake Austin, Travis County).
37. Coleman v. Forister, 497 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error
granted. The court's discussion not only listed several Texas cases in support of its
decision, but also cited and analyzed legal writings on this issue and on the ancillary
issue of mandatory injunctions to cure encroachments and violations of building restrictions.
38. 484 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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certain lots for a proposed controlled access state highway, together with all
rights of access from the other abutting lots in the same city addition. The
highway had been completed in 1963, and in 1964 the plaintiff had purchased the remaining lots with actual notice that they did not have direct
access to the highway. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim of a right to reacquire access, the court relied on an express statutory denial of the fight of
access to controlled access highway locations;3 9 however, in light of the facts
in the case it is doubtful that the plaintiff could have succeeded even in
the absence of such statutory denial. In Dailey v. Alarid40 the plaintiff unsuccessfully relied on the general public's use of a road for more than ten
consecutive years in an attempt to impose a prescriptive roadway easement
on the defendant's land. The court's opinion not only cited the ever-growing
line of cases, beginning with the 1960 decision by the supreme court in
O'Connor v. Gragg,41 which have held that use by the landowner renders
the claimant's consistent use merely permissive and not adverse, but also rejected all contrary implications in a 1947 court of civil appeals case cited
42
by the plaintiff.
Finally, in a case of first impression decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 43 the court considered what rights and obligations arise when partially inconsistent right-of-way easements are granted
to the same third party by two separate groups of co-tenants. In this case
the third party, a pipeline company, 44 first obtained a singe-pipeline easement from one of two groups of co-tenants and then obtained a multiple-

pipeline easement from the second group. After both groups had transferred
their interest to a single owner, the pipeline company notified the owner of
its desire to utilize the multiple-pipeline easement. The owner objected and
the pipeline company effected its plans despite the owner's objections. The
court, in awarding damages to the owner, 45 held: (1) a tenant in common
.cannot impose an easement upon the common property without its co-tenants' consent (citing ample Texas case authority); (2) a tenant in common,
39. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6674w-i (1969). Although not essential to
the holding in this case, it should be noted that the question of compensation in cases
of access denial is far from settled. See Rayburn, Legal Rights and Legal Fictions in

Condemnation, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 251 (1973); Rollins, The Controlled Access Highway-Conflicting Rights of Highway Users and Abutting Commercial Enterprises, 11
BAYLOR L. REV. 149 (1959); Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power
of Eminent Domain, 47 TEXAs L. REv. 733 (1969); Comment, Eminent Domain v.
Police Powers as Related to the Abutting Owner's Right of Access, 14 BAYLOR L. REV.
70 (1962).

40. 486 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
41.

161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960).

42. Fowler v. Matthews, 204 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947). The
Fowler opinion, together with two other opinions containing similar implications (one
being a 1951 supreme court decision), were ignored by the supreme court in the O'Connor decision. See Rust v. Engledow, 368 S.W.2d 635, 638 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Whco
1963), error ref. n.r.e.
43. Texas Mortgage Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 470 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973).

44. Actually, the record reflected the existence of two pipeline companies; however, see note 2 of the court's opinion which resolves the existence of two pipeline companies with its continuous reference to a single third party. Id. at 499 n.2.

45. The term "owner" actually refers to a series of owners, the named appellee be-

ing the next-to-last in the series. Id. at 498-99.

1974]

PROPERTY

therefore, cannot effectively grant to a third party an easement conferring
a greater privilege than that authorized by its co-tenants; (3) in the instant
case, when fee title merged into one owner, only the lesser easement had
been validly granted; and (4) as a result, the greater easement was rendered
void ab initio when -fee title merged.
Title Insurance. In Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Prendergast46 the
supreme court set out the following "black-letter law" with regard to title
insurance: (1) In the absence of an explicit negation of coverage, which
the supreme court found does not exist in present title insurance forms, an
insured may sue on his policy merely because of the failure of his title and
need not prove an eviction, as is required in a suit for breach of warranty
deed; 47 (2) if title fails as to "less than the whole of the property," quoting
from the present title insurance forms, the amount recoverable on the policy
bears the same ratio to the policy amount as the value of the outstanding
interest as of the date of the policy bore to -the value of the full insured title
as of the date of the policy;48 and (3) the above formula is not limited, as
the supreme court had in a prior opinion indicated, 49 and as the court of
civil appeals had ruled, 50 to a physically indentifiable portion which is
"less than the whole" (such as two acres out of a ten-acre tract), but
applies to any partial interest in the whole (such as the undivided onetenth outstanding interest involved in the instant case). In addition the
court apparently held that if a title insurer at any time removes the objectionable defect in title-even after the insured has lost a sale because
of the insurer's initial refusal or inability to remove the defect-the insured's damages "will be no more than nominal." 51 Although perhaps
generally consistent with the remainder of the court's decision, this final
principle should be clarified in future cases. In the instant case the court
of appeals opinion pointed out that although the insured parties had lost a
sale because of the title defect, the insurer originally had in writing denied"any further duty regarding this title," and had not taken curative action until
almost six years after the insureds' initial request. The supreme court ignored these facts in its opinion, and instead indicated that the insureds had
46. 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973).

47. Rancho Bonito Land & Live-Stock Co. v. North, 92 Tex. 72, 45 S.W. 994
(1898), discussed and approved in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 301-03, 294 S.W.2d
781, 788-90 (1956), and reaffirmed by implication in the instant case. See Note, Title
Guaranty Companies Are Subject to Suit by the Insured on the Title Insurance Contract Although No Suit Has Been Filed Against the Insured and No Adverse Claimant
Has Taken Possession of the Property, 8 HouSTON L. REv. 580 (1971).

48. The supreme court thus affirmed, with reference to present title insurance
forms, its 1964 decision that title insurance insures against "actual loss" but does not
insure the "benefit of the bargin." American Title Ins. Co. v. Byrd, 384 S.W.2d 683

(Tex. 1964); cf. Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922), opinion

adopted; Comment, Damages for Breach of Warranty in a Deed, 19 BAYLOR L. REV.
289 (1967).

49. Shaver v. Nat'l Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1962) (title
provision for proportionate payment is not applicable to a pipeline easement covering
the entire tract which is insured). In the instant case the supreme court expressly
overruled its prior decision, "to the extent of the inconsistency." 494 S.W.2d at 158.

50. Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 478 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), aff'd but remanded, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973).
51. 494 S.W.2d at 158.
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not given the insurer "a reasonable opportunity to clear the title" because
during the initial trial, and, therefore, after the insurer's written denial and
the insureds' loss of their sale, the insurer "expressed its willingness" to file
52
a curative law suit and the insureds "did not request that action."
Although the Prendergastlitigation was the only significant judicial activity during the survey year affecting title insurance, two other developments
deserve mention. First, the State Board of Insurance in a title insurance
bulletin5" adopted a position regarding the deletion of the printed "survey
exception" in title policies,5 4 which represents a considerable concession to
title insurance companies. Essentially, the new bulletin reverses in part a
bulletin issued in 1972 which appeared to require that a deletion of the "survey exception" be drawn in such a way that -the policy insures the area as
well as the boundaries of the property.5 5 The new bulletin permits in certain instances, depending on the size and configuration of the insured property, that the title policy be drawn so that area is not insured when the "survey exception" is deleted. In light of the new board policy, and because
the insurance of area is often quite valuable, especially in transactions where
price is a direct correlative of area, purchasers should be advised to solicit
a prospective insurer's willingness to insure area before placing an order with
that insurer.
Secondly, during the regular session of the 63d Legislature the house committee on the judiciary reported out favorably a bill which, if enacted, would
have authorized attorneys to provide a form of title insurance to their
clients. 56 This concept is not new; in Florida, for example, attorneys have
been insuring title for approximately twenty-five years. 57 Moreover, it represents primarily an attempt to restore to attorneys business which in the
past two decades has been shifted to title insurance companies because of
their ability to add the feature of insurance to the traditional attorney's title
opinion. 58 The bill would have allowed attorneys to compete with title companies by authorizing them to set up an insurance fund and embellish their
title opinions with insurance of title.5 9 Viewed from one perspective, this
attempted intrusion into title company business may be a proper response
to the high-handed practices of certain title companies which dilute their in52. Id.
53.

Tex. Bd. of Ins. Bull. No. 144 (Dec. 18, 1973).

Since Jan. 1, 1946, the State

Board of Insurance has issued bulletins in accordance with its regulatory responsibility.
See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.21 (1963).

54. This provision in a policy of title insurance provides that the following is excepted from coverage: "Any discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or boundary
lines, or any encroachments, or any overlapping of improvements." It may be deleted
by presentation of an acceptable survey and, in the case of an owner's policy but not
a mortgagee's policy, payment of an additional premium equal to 15% of the normal
premium or $20, whichever is greater.
55. Tex. Bd. of Ins. Bull. No. 135 (April 10, 1972).
56. H.B. 1104, 63d Leg. (1973), which would have added chapter 50 of the Insurance Code, was entitled the "Texas Attorneys Title Insurance Act." The bill was re-

ported out of committee on May 11, 1973, but was never acted upon by the house.
57. See Carter, Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 480 (1955).
58. See Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492 (1957).

59. The insurance fund would have been administered by a statewide agency, perhaps a subsidiary of the State Bar of Texas, with supervision by the State Board of
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surance policies with unwaranted exceptions in order to reduce their risks 60
and, at the same time, assure each consumer that because of their concern
for his interests (and their willingness to draft the necessary legal documents
as an additional low-cost "service") he need not employ an attorney to represent him in the transaction. On the other hand, one must question
whether the consumer would necessarily be benefited merely by having the
lawyer shift into the same role in which the title companies now find themselves. In allowing the lawyer to be a principal in a title transaction, i.e.,
one who may suffer financially because of his title insurance policy, the proposed statute, if enacted, might have added competition to the title insurance
business without substantially curing the present evils. Notwithstanding an
impressive recent espousal of bar-related title insurance by an eminently
qualified author, 61 this author has concluded that, although bar-related title
insurance may provide some benefit to consumers, the real solution to title
insurance abuse lies not as much in permitting new competitive sources of
insurance as in urging effective regulation of existing sources.
II.

PURCHASES AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS

Contracts of Sale. Each year courts are approached by litigants disputing
whether their real property contracts are precise enough to be enforced.
Most often, the controlling question is whether the property description
"within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, [furnishes] the
means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with
reasonable certainty." 62 During the survey year, as usual, 63 at least two
otherwise-qualified purchasers were given painful instruction in property
identification. 64 However, the supreme court in Johnson v. Snell" did offer
60. The list of unwarranted exceptions, which are all too often added in kitchensink fashion without explanation to the insured, is legion; however, the most popular
appear to be the following: "visible but unrecorded easements and encroachments"
(often extended to cover underground easements as well); "rights of parties in possession" (actually added to many title company printed forms despite the Board's requirement that it be included only if the insured executes a written waiver); "restrictive covenants" (seldom annotated with the permitted annotation, "none of record"); "public
and private roads" (seldom with an attempt to define them by reference to a survey).
Moreover, frequently a customer is not advised of his right to have the survey exception
deleted or to have area guaranteed. See notes 53-55 supra, and accompanying text.
See also Thau, Protecting the Real Estate Buyer's Title, 3 REAL ESTATE REV., Winter

1974, at 71, 79: "On occasion, title companies in Texas will add exceptions to owner's
policies . . . [which] are strictly prohibited by the Texas Insurance Board."
61. Balbach, Bar-Related Title Insurance, 37 TEx. B.J. 241 (1974). The author
acknowledges that the opinions expressed in the preceding paragraph may reflect his
role as the acknowledged "devil's advocate" in the Lawyer's Title Guaranty Fund Committee of the State Junior Bar of Texas. However, perhaps even a portion of the Balbach article, id., supports this author's opinions. Compare note 60 supra with the following excerpt from Mr. Balbach's exegesis: "Why should he [a lawyer issuing an insured title opinion] risk unlimited liability for himself by writing a good title opinion
on a bad title? The experience in Florida has been that in writing opinions to adequately protect their clients, attorneys have adequately protected the company [i.e., the
insurance fund]." Id. at 245.
62. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972). See also Note, Statute
of Frauds-Sufficiency of Description, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 413 (1972).
63. See, e.g., Stalcup & Williams, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 20, 26-27 (1971).
64. Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1973) (plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to demonstrate that his contract was a "selection type" contract in which exact
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some hope for mortal draftsmen. In that case the defendant had denied
her obligations under a land purchase contract because, among other defenses, the contract (1) had not recited the exact purchase price, (2) had
not specified the amount of the vendor's lien note, (3) had not provided
for the place of payment for the vendor's lien note, and (4) had not included any provisions for the deed of trust. Prior to the supreme court's
decision which enforced the contract notwithstanding all allegations of the
defendant, the court of civil appeals had ruled that the contract was too indefinite to be enforced. 6 6 Moreover, the lower court's opinion had caused
some concern to contract draftsmen in that it had approved the defendant's
four principal defenses without clearly distinguishing their relative importance. In the supreme court's reversal, the court not only rejected the first
two defenses by analyzing the facts of the case 7 but also specifically negated
the legal validity of the fourth defense and ignored the third defense entirely.
In Foster v. Bullard 8 the court faced the factual determinations of an
adequate property description and a sufficiently definite price and also considered two legal issues in connection with a "right of first refusal," that is,
the option to purchase property when and if the owner decides to sell it
to a third party. First, the court held that a first refusal option without
a termination date could not be voided by recourse to the rule against perpetuities.6 9 In light of the facts in the case, the court's determination of
this issue appears to be a correct extension of the case authority cited in
the opinion which, even prior to the addition of article 1291b in 196970
reflected a liberal attitude of judicial contracts enforcement notwithstanding perpetuities defenses. 71 However, the court's statement that "the
contract does not fall within the rule against perpetuities" may incorrectly
imply that the rule's applicability should not even be considered in refusal option situations. A more precise statement would have acknowledged that an option is to be reviewed from the perpetuities perspective
even though under most fact situations the defense will not be invoked. 72
identification was unnecessary); Wright v. Povlish, 498 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to ascertain
the exact boundaries of the property by reference to additional documents). But see
Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e., discussed at notes 67-73 infra, and accompanying text (property description held to be
sufficient).
65. 504 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1973), as amended, (1974).
66. Johnson v. Snell, 489 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972),
rev'd and remanded, 504 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1973).
67. 504 S.W.2d at 398-99. See also Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724, 734 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (first refusal option upheld where price was
to be "consistent with... [any other offer], but not less than $750 per acre").
68. 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
69. Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error
ref. n.r.e.
70. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1291b (Supp. 1974). See also Note, Perpetuities-Texas Enacts Cy Pres Statute, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 181 (1970).

71. See Martin v. Lott, 482 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972). See also
Larson, Perpetuities in Texas, 1950-1967, 21 Sw. L.J. 751, 755-58 (1967).
72. See Larson, supra note 71, at 756: "The optionee has a type of contingent
future interest in a particular tract, and the policy of the Rule Against Perpetuities ex-
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Further, the court held that the optionor's notice of a proposed sale
and the optionee's failure to exercise his purchase right did not automatically extinguish the option; therefore, when the first proposed sale was
not completed, the optionee's rights continued to apply to a subsequent proposed sale. In reaching this decision the court followed precedent from another state, 73 having found no Texas decision on point.
Regulation of Brokers Drafting Contracts. During the past few years representatives of the State Bar of Texas and the Texas Association of Realtors74 have worked toward resolving the sensitive problem of determining
what constitutes unauthorized legal practice in the preparation of real estate
contacts. 75
In January 1972 these two organizations reached agreement
on a proposed "Statement of Principles" identifying functions and limitations
of broker and lawyer 70 and a proposed "Earnest Money Contract" for use
by brokers in all real estate sales transactions. In order to achieve mandatory status for the Statement of Principles, it was submitted to the Texas
Real Estate Commission which obtained a ruling from the Texas Attorney
General that such mandatory status could be imposed upon licensed realtors
by the commission. 77 After hearings held August 14, 1973, the commission
in December approved the Statement of Principles, in a revised form which
failed to incorporate the Earnest Money Contract. As this Article goes to
the printer, the State Bar of Texas has ratified the commission's action, 78
but with certain modifications to the form approved by the Texas Real Estate Commission.
The Statement of Principles has evoked intense debate by brokers and
lawyers as to whether one profession is intruding into territory where the
other feels it need not tread. In fact the Statement of Principles does seem
to grant brokers more authority than they are authorized under present
law. 79 Moreover, the Statement of Principles and Earnest Money Contract
tends to it. Free alienability of land would be impaired if options to purchase of indefinite duration were enforced."
73. L.E. Wallach, Inc. v. Toll, 381 Pa. 423, 113 A.2d 258 (1955).
74. Membership in the Texas Association of Realtors is not mandatory for licensed

real estate salesmen and brokers; however, a substantial percentage of those licensed
in the state are members of that Association.
75. The State Bar Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 3 (Supp. 1973)

provides:

"[AIIl persons not members of the State Bar are hereby prohibited from

practicing law in this State except as provided above." See also the Real Estate License Act, id. art. 6573a, § 17 (Supp. 1974); Comment, Unauthorized Practice and
Conveying: A Modest Proposal, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 409 (1973); Annot., Drafting or
Filling in Blanks in Printed Forms, of Instruments Relating to Land by Real Estate
Agents, Brokers, or Managers as Constituting Practice of Law, 53 A.L.R.2d 788

(1957).
76. The "Statement of Principles," as amended twice during and subsequent to the
survey year, is reprinted at Proposed Statement of Principles for Lawyers, Realtors, 37
TEX. B.J. 246 (1974).

77. TEX. ATr'Y

GEN.

Op. No. M-1256 (1972).

78. The State Bar Board of Directors approved the Statement of Principles during
its April 25-26, 1974, meeting in Brownsville.
79. In Canere v. Martin, 238 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951), error dismissed, the court held that a broker's preparing of a contract for a real property exchange did not constitute the practice of law. The Canere decision was quite possibly
in conflict with supreme court authority when it was decided. See Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
Moreover, the

contract in question in the Canere case had been drawn prior to the effective date of
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in their original forms certainly merited criticism conceptually-for example,
in authorizing only one form of contract for all transactions-and technically. Nevertheless, the revisions appear to have remedied the conceptual
deficiencies and have set the foundation for improving the technical deficiencies.8 0 As adequate standard form contracts are promulgated, -the Statement of Principles, if adopted, should provide valuable consumer protection
without unduly restricting broker activities.
Conveyances. Several cases during the survey year involved challenges to
the validity, manner, or effect of conveyances. In Venable v. Patti8l a veteran had acquired equitable title to property through the Veteran's Land
Board8 2 in March 1966, and had -transferred his interest, as well as possession to the property, in December 1968. He later changed his mind and
sued in trespass to try title88 to rescind the 1968 agreement. The court held
that since the enabling legislation requires the "original veteran purchaser"
to "enjoy possession for a period of three (3) years,"'8 4 the 1968 agreement
was in direct contravention of the statute and, therefore, not enforceable.
Although not discussed in its opinion, the court evidently believed the public
policy of discouraging future transactions of this type to be greater than considerations of in pari delicto and unjust enrichment, which might have denied either party the right to judicial relief, thus leaving the defendant in
85
possession.
Finally, two cases during the survey year involved the validity or extent
of warranties in property conveyances. In one case" the court reaffirmed
the principle that a county is liable on warranties contained in a deed executed on its behalf by its officials despite the absence of express permission
in its enabling legislation for the granting of warranties.87 In the second
the present § 17 of The Real Estate License Act, which clearly prohibits contract drafting by brokers. In fact, the opinion by the attorney general, cited supra at note 77,
indicated that the Principles may be somewhat of a concession to brokers, granting
them authority to fill in blanks on a form contract, which is not permitted under present law.
80. The revised Statement of Principles now gives a joint broker-lawyer committee
authority to draft more than one form of standard contract. Thus, separate forms may
be drawn for undeveloped speculative land, improved commercial real property, residential real property, etc.
81. 490 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
82. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m (Supp. 1973) permits a veteran to select
a tract of land (which must qualify under certain tests), solicit the Veteran's Land
Board to purchase the tract, and take possession of and equitable title to the tract by
executing a Contract of Sale and Purchase with the Board. Essentially, the Board
merely provides attractive financing (5% down; 40-year amortization at 5 % interest) and has no possessory intent; however, the statute requires that the transaction
be structured as a contract for deed instead of the normal first lien deed of trust.
83. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text, for mention of the procedural aspect of this case.
84. "[Nlo property sold under the provisions of this Act shall be transferred, sold,
or conveyed in whole or in part, until the original veteran purchaser has enjoyed possession for a period of three (3) years from the date of purchase of said property
. ..

"

TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m, § 17 (Supp. 1974).

85. See generally 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1534-36 (1962).
86. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Bauer, 493 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973),
error ref. n.r.e. See the discussion of the boundary-dispute aspects of this case in the
text accompanying notes 21, 22 supra.
87. See Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99
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case, which involved warranties of fitness in a new home, .the plaintiffs were
allowed $2,980 in damages to cure a physical defect (a faulty foundation)
but were denied any recovery based on the "serious emotional stress upon
88
the lady of the house."
Interstate Land Sales. On September 4, 1973, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development published an amended chapter of regulations 9 concerning the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 90 Because the Act
itself is not limited to Texas transactions and because academic commentaries on the Act and the prior regulations have been plentiful, 91 this Article
will not attempt to analyze the changes in depth. Nevertheless, a few comments do seem appropriate. The new regulations expressly include a condominium unit in the definition of a "lot" subject to the Act. Because most
condominium unit sales and leases involve building contracts (if not existing
structures), they will normally qualify for the exemption available when the
seller or lessor is obligated to complete a structure within two years of the date
of the contract; however, if proposed public facilities, such as a golf course
or country club, constitute a major inducement to the purchaser or lessee,
and if the seller or lessor is not obligated to complete such public facilities
within the two-year period, the transaction may be subject 'to the filing and
informational requirements of the Act. As for the property report which
must be submitted to prospective purchasers and lessees, the new regulations have increased the informational content and have added safeguards
against developers who attempt to satisfy the letter, but not the spirit, of the
Act.
Brokerage. It is perhaps a comment on the increasing complexity of real
estate brokerage that of the four noteworthy cases in this area decided during the survey year, three involved statutory restrictions and only one involved questions of common law. In the latter case 92 the court upheld the
familiar rule that prior and contemporaneous agreements inconsistent with
integrated written contracts 98 must be considered as having been either
waived or merged into the writings. 94 As for the cases dealing with statu(1961); City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 202 S.W.2d 448 (1947); Abbot v.
City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 474, 79 S.W. 1064 (1904).
88. Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
89. 38 Fed. Reg. 23866 (1973).
90. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (Supp. 1974).
91. See, e.g., Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure
Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1969); Dorsey, Regulation of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN. L. REv. 605 (1973); Kretcher, Federal Regulation of
Interstate Land Sales, 4 REAL PROP., PROD. & TRUST J. 327 (1969); Morris, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evaluation, 24 S.C.L. REv. 331
(1972); Walsh, Consumer Protection in Land Development Sales, 5 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TRUST J. 167 (1970); Comment, A Handbook to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 27 ARK.L. REV. 65 (1973).
92. Reeves v. Lago Vista, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973),
error ref. n.r.e.
93. In this case integration was not accomplished explicitly but rather implicitly
by the following introduction: "This will confirm our agreement of a prior date .
Id. at 951.
94. Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30 (1958); see Corn-
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tory interpretations, the case of Sherman v. Bruton95 constitutes a mild setback for attorney-brokers in Texas. In that case, apparently one of first
impression concerning the relationship of the statute of frauds provision and
the attorney's exemption under The Real Estate License Act of 1955,96 the
court (1) ruled that a written contract is necessary for judicial enforcement
of a real estate commission, even if the claimant is an attorney, and (2)
characterized as a disguised commission claim the plaintiff's attempt to recover monies for real estate consulting, appraisal services, legal services, and
professional engineering services. The plaintiff was licensed as an attorney
and as a professional engineer and had even been successful in convincing
the jury that he had performed legal and engineering services for the defendants and that for a portion of his claimed recovery he had not acted "as
a real estate broker for the purpose of collecting a commission." However,
in upholding the trial court's judgment for the defendants notwithstanding
the verdict, the court held as a matter of law that the parties had considered
all additional services to be merely incidental to the brokerage services performed by the plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff's claim
was barred by the statute of frauds. The case is interesting because of the
court's determination of the primary legal issue 97 and also because of the
practical lesson it teaches. The facts of the case show not only that the
plaintiff was denied recovery after having performed considerable services,
but also that his plea for compensation was rejected by another professional, 98 who was an acquaintance of many years and "a kinsman of his
wife." 9 9

The last two cases depart from traditional brokerage concepts and enter
into the modern concept of "syndication."'"0 A quick summary of these
two cases will have the appearance of a paradox because the most important
brokerage case of the survey year-and probably the most important case
ment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TExAs L. REV. 361
(1949).
95. 497 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
96. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (1967). Section 28 of the Act provides:
"No action shall be brought in any court in this State for the recovery of any commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agreement upon which
action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and signed
by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him thereunder lawfully
authorized." (Emphasis added.) However, subsection (3) of section 6 provides: "The
provisions of this Act shall not . . . be construed to include in any way services rendered by an attorney at law .... "
97. The court's careful analysis included the distinguishing of a previous supreme
court decision, Burchfield v. Markham, 156 Tex. 329, 294 S.W.2d 795 (1956).
98. Jeff B. Bruton, co-defendant with his wife and mother, was a dentist. In fact,
at one point in their dealings when the plaintiff had been asked about a written agreement, he allegedly had replied: "No. You are a professional and I am a professional,
and we understand what it is, that I will be the only one working on it, and that I
will be paid when a deal is made." 497 S.W.2d at 318.
99. Id. It is not clear which party was a kinsman to whose wife, but this fact
is not essential for instilling the practical lesson of this case.
100. See 8 H. KENDRICK, & J. KENDRICK, TEXAS TRANSACTION GUIDE §§ 86.01-.23
(1973); Burton, Real Estate Syndications in Texas: An Examination of Securities
Problems, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 239 (1973); Greenwood, Syndication of Undeveloped Real
Estate and Securities Laws Implications, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 53 (1971). See also Sonfield, The Texas Limited Partnershipas a Vehicle for Real Estate Investment, 3 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13 (1971).
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in this area for several years-did not involve real estate brokerage, and
because the second case exacerbates the danger of the first case in its holding that The Real Estate License Act was not applicable to the transaction
in question. In the first case, The Rowland Corp. v. Integrated Systems
Technology, Inc., 01 the plaintiff had sued the defendant for a brokerage
commission allegedly arising from -the plaintiff's efforts in the private placement of the defendant's securities. It was not disputed that the sale of the
defendant's securities was exempt from all securities registration requirements by virtue of section 51 of the Texas Securities Act. 10 2 While acknowledging this exemption, the court nevertheless interpreted section 34 of the
Act as denying the enforceability of a commission claim for the sale of securities unless the claimant was a registered securities dealer at the time the
claim arose. 10 3 Although the reasoning of the court is dubious at best, the
0
brunt of analysis should be reserved to the corporate and securities bar.1' 4
The effect of the Rowland decision can be better appreciated when considered in light of Sunshine v. Mid-South Construction, Inc., 0 5 a case in
which the trial court had granted summary judgment against the plaintiff
because he had not been a licensed real estate broker or salesman.' 0 6 On
appeal the court reversed the trial court, holding that in selling interests in
real estate limited partnerships the plaintiff "was not acting as a real estate
broker or salesman and hence required no license as such."'10 7 Although
not discussed by the court, a possible extension of its holding is that the
plaintiff was selling "securities" as defined in the Texas Securities Act. To
be sure, the development and extension of the category "securities" has been
ably charted by legal commentators; 10 8 however, the emphasis is normally
placed on registration and fraud issues. These two cases bring to the fore
a new danger-loss of brokerage commissions.' 0 9
101. 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
102. The Texas Securities Act is codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581
(1957). Id. § 51 provides Texas' version of the "private offering" exemption.
103. The court's interpretation seems to have been determined by the existence of
the last comma in § 34 which denies the enforceability of a commission agreement unless the claimant was licensed and the securities were registered "provided, however,
that this section or provision of this Act shall not apply to exempt transactions set
forth in Section 5 of this Act nor to the sale and purchase of exempt securities listed
in Section 6 of this Act, when sold by a registered dealer." (Emphasis added.) Although not expressed by the court, its determination that the last clause applies to § 5
exempt transactions may have been different if that clause had not been separated by
a comma from the provision relating to § 6 exempt securities.
104. In the midst of an extended critical analysis of the case, Professor Alan R.
Bromberg remarked: "Quite apart from ignoring precedent, the Rowland decision is
wrong in terms of grammar, structure, history and policy." Bromberg, Collectibility
of Commissions on Exempt Transactions in Securities, 11 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON
CORPORATION, BANKING & BusiNEss LAw, Oct. 1973, at 3.
105. 496 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
106. The Real Estate License Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19
(1969), provides: "No person or company may bring or maintain any action for the
collection of compensation . . . without alleging and proving that the person or company performing the brokerage services was a duly licensed real estate broker or salesman ....
107. 496 S.W.2d at 711.
108. See the authorities cited at note 100 supra. See also Rifkind & Borton, SEC
Registration of Real Estate Interests: An Overview, 27 Bus. LAw. 649 (1972).
109. For a recent analysis of federal law on this subject, with comparisons to Cal-
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Fortunately for the real estate salesmen and brokers of this state, the State
Securities Board of Texas has demonstrated a commendable degree of
sophistication and flexibility in devising special rules and procedures which
preserve the spirit of consumer protection but provide special assistance to
real estate professionals. Early in the survey year the Board adopted a limited examination requirement (an examination essentially limited to the
Texas Securities Act) for licensed real estate salesmen or brokers "seeking
registration as a securities dealer or salesman for the purpose of dealing exclusively in real estate partnership interests." 110 Moreover, the Board has
circulated a form for an intrastate real estate prospectus,"' which although
not promulgated as final, is currently being accepted by the Board and is
being processed (and the first letter of comment issued) within five-to-ten
days. 112 Finally, the Board has issued Proposed Guidelines for the Registration of Real Estate Program,;s 3 in an attempt to provide both certainty
in the registration process and a modicum of regularity in the substance of
real estate syndication.
III.

DEVELOPMENT: FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTION

Senate Bill No. 209. The most significant development in the area of interest regulation during the survey year was an unsuccessful attempt by the
63d Legislature to adapt interest statutes to modern real estate transaction
necessities."14 This attempt was embodied in Senate Bill No. 209"x5 which,
the legislature evidently believed, (1) would have withdrawn large real estate
ifornia and New York state law, see Augustine & Fass, Broker-DealerLicensing in the
Field of Real Estate Syndication, 29 Bus. LAW. 369 (1974).
110. Texas Securities Board, Policy Statement (Dec. 26, 1972). As of the date this
Article goes to the printer, eighteen dealers and ninety-eight salesmen have qualified
through the limited-examination procedure.
111. The most recent version, dated Nov. 13, 1972, has been reprinted at 8 H.
KENDRICK & J.KENDRICK, supra note 100, § 86.23.
112. As of the date this Article goes to the printer, five intrastate real estate
prospectuses have been filed with the board and three have been registered.
113. The latest version is dated March 8, 1974. Although subject to further revision, these guidelines do provide the basis for the board's review of an intrastate real
estate prospectus. [Editor's Note: The board adopted its final version on May 24, 1974.]
114. Among the numerous academic requests for such adaption, see Loiseaux, Some
Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 419, 444 (1971); Merriman
& Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD.
L. REV. 1, 12-18 (1967); Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current ConvenienceA Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 258 (1968). Of course, these
articles also emphasize the recent concern of lenders due to rising interest rates, as do
the following articles: Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in Real Estate Financing,
4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 315 (1969); Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market-Revisited, 24 Bus. LAW. 1121 (1969); Rodell, The Application of Usury
Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 136 (1972); Comment,
Lender Participationin Borrower's Venture; a Scheme to Receive Usurious Interest, 8
HOUSTON L. REv. 546 (1971); Comment, The Application of Texas Usury Laws to
Equity ParticipationAgreements, 48 1'_xAs L. REV. 925 (1970); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d
475 (1967).
115. Entitled "An Act amending Chapter 1, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, as amended, by adding a new Article 1.042, providing a general rule for
determination of the rate of interest on real estate loans secured by a lien and authorizing refund or credit of excess interest charges in the event of premature termination
of loans and relating to real estate loans over $500,000 secured by a lien made by individuals; providing for prospective application only of this Act; and declaring an emergency." S.B. 209, 63d Leg. (1973).
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transactions from restrictive interest regulation by increasing the legal interest rate in such transactions from ten percent per annum to eighteen percent
per annum, and (2) would have solidified the concept of "spreading" frontend interest over the term of a loan. 116 Senate Bill No. 209 was passed
by the legislature; however, it was vetoed by Governor Briscoe, 117 apparently more as the result of ambiguities in draftsmanship than of any philosophical disagreement with the content of the bill." 8 Not only were the two principal ambiguities specified by the Governor serious impediments to effective
implementation of the bill, 119 but the bill unfortunately suffered from numerous other ambiguities. 120 Nevertheless, with interest rates reaching record
116. For an example of the use of "spreading" see Imperial Corp. of America v.
Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed in Hemingway,
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 18, 25-26 (1973). Although generally excellent in analysis and comment, that law review article may be subject to misinterpretation as to one aspect of the Frenchman's Creek case. The case was not one
which "dealt with . . . whether. . loan or commitment fees constituted front end interest" as indicated in the article, id. at 25; instead, the court merely stated that the
lender "does not contest the finding that the $67,500 commitment fee was 'front end'
interest." 453 F.2d at 1343. Moreover, as tacitly admitted during the course of litigation by the lender, the case does not deal with a true commitment fee in the commercial lending sense inasmuch as the so-called "commitment fee" was not paid until the
day of the initial advance. For cases in which true commitment fees (i.e., a lender's
fee for agreeing to consummate a loan on or before a future date, at the borrower's
request) have been held not to be interest, see: Regional Enterprises, Inc. v. Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 352 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965); Chambers & Co. v.
Equitable Life Assurance Co. of the United States, 224 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955);
Goldman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 251 Md. 575, 248 A.2d 154 (1968); Paley
v. Barton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (1964); Boston Road
Shopping Center v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d
522 (1961). See also Wolf, The Refundable Commitment Fee, 23 Bus. LAw. 1065
(1968).
117. See Tax. CONsT. art. IV, § 14 for the veto privilege authorized the Governor.
Although that section permits legislative override of a veto, because the veto of Senate
Bill No. 209 was handed down at the end of the legislative session, it was in effect
an absolute veto.
118. In the Governor's proclamation of veto his comments on the purpose of the
bill were neutral in tenor, and his conclusion was as follows: "Were the bill in an
area less critical to the financial life of the state, I would be constrained to a clarification by the courts over a period of years. S.B. 209, however, deals with a subject so
vital both to lending institutions and to borrowers, that I believe it is wise to await
a more carefully drawn codification." Proclamation of the Governor of the State of
Texas, June 16, 1973. On the other hand, it should be noted that a written opposition
to the bill, prepared by Senator William N. (Bill) Patman, Ganado, Texas, and the
Texas Consumers Association, was presented to the Governor, accompanied by examples of abuses which the bill allegedly would have permitted.
119. The Governor's objection to § 1(a) of the bill (the "spreading" provision)
centered on the absence of a definition for the word "loan." In fact, that provision
in the bill might have been interpreted to permit "spreading" of interest on the amount
of the loan before discount, thus reversing established case law that the interest rate
for usury determinations must be computed on the amount actually disbursed by the
lender (i.e., after deducting "points" or other front-end charges). See Imperial Corp.
of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1972); Nevels
v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937). The Governor's objection
to § l(b) of the bill (18% interest on $500,000 real estate loans) centered on the legislature's obvious mistake in authorizing only "an individual" to borrow at the higher
rate. Inasmuch as art. 5069-1.01(e), the definitional preface to the proposed article,
appears to exclude from the definition of "individual" a "partnership, corporation, joint
venture, trust, association or any legal entity," the legislature's choice of words would
have rendered that provision ineffectual without a later amendment or a quite liberal
judicial interpretation.
120. In § l(b), for example, the limitation of coverage to "loans which are over
$500,000 and secured by a first lien real estate mortgage" raises questions such as the
following: (1) Is, for example, a $550,000 construction loan commitment a "loan over
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levels, and with the commercial loan participants' traditional resort to a
"nominee" (also called "dummy," "straw," or "conduit") corporation loan
being neither assuredly usury-proof for the lender12 ' nor even substantially
sure of preserving the borrower's individual tax benefits,' 2 2 the bill with all
of its flaws probably would have been preferable to no bill at all. Certainly
in large commercial transactions remedial legislation is needed. With the
exception of a possible anti-inflation argument, which even if valid123 appears to be insufficient to support statutes of such a penal nature (especially
as compared, for example, with the wage-freeze and price-freeze restrictions
and procedures set up pursuant to the federal Economic Stabilization Program), this author has reviewed no effective argument against a separation
of the commercial transactions from the politically sensitive consumer home
mortgage loan.' 2 4 Such separation has already been accomplished in several
other states, primarily through establishing a loan ceiling above which usury
$500,000" if the first advance is only $250,000 (especially complicated in the event
of contingencies to full funding, such as unknown construction costs or rental requirements)? (2) Is a $1,000,000 corporate rehabilitation loan qualified when $450,000 of
the loan is secured by the corporation's real estate holdings and the remainder is secured by inventory? (3) Does the requirement of a "first lien" preclude the lien for
ad valorem taxes (which attaches on January 1 of each year even though the tax itself
is normally not payable until October 1)?
Moreover, by making reference to "the same rate of interest as corporations" the provision merely perpetuates the interpretative problem of whether the interest rate of "one
and one-half percent (1 Y %) per month," as permitted by the Texas Miscellaneous
Corporations Laws Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974), is the
same as 18% per year. See note 134 infra. In § l(a) the wording of the proviso
caused lenders concern in that the use of imprecise language in a prepayment privilege
could have required the refunding of interest, currently not necessary under Texas law.
See Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
121. See Comment, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 CoLUM. L. REV.
1390 (1968).
Compare Leader v. Dinkler Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 230
N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1967), and Monmouth Capital Corp. v. Holmdel Village Shops,
Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 480, 224 A.2d 35 (1966), with Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So.
2d 682 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1960), and Gangadean
v. Flori Inv. Co., 106 Ariz. 245, 474 P.2d 1006 (1970). The writer wishes to acknowledge that authorities cited in this note and the next are derived from an outline presented on Feb. 4, 1974, to the Dallas Bar Association's Section of Taxation by Richard
A. Massman, attorney at law, Dallas, Texas.
122. See Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When Will They Be Recognized; What
Can and Should Be Done, 39 J. TAXATION 54 (1973); Tax and Business Considerations
in Use of Conduit Corporationfor Real Estate Ownership (Report of [ABA] Subcommittee of Committee on Tax Aspects of Real Estate Transactions), 5 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 518 (1970); Tilley, Dummy Corporations for Real Estate Holding
Purposes, 33 rEx. B.J. 445 (1970). In addition to the authorities cited in those articles, see Dave Stillman, 60 T.C. No. 95 (Sept. 17, 1973) and Louis Steinmetz, 32
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 969 (Sept. 19, 1973).
, 123. Because commercial loan participants will attempt to find some way to structure their transactions so that lenders may receive a rate of return equal to the current
market rate, it might be argued that the main effect of usury laws on the commercial
economy is inflationary (i.e., adding to the borrower's cost of obtaining financing) instead of anti-inflationary.
124. Obviously opponents of Senate Bill No. 209 were not objecting to the bill's effect on the interest rates charged in normal credit card or finance company transactions inasmuch as those transactions are regulated by the Texas Consumer Credit
Code, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.01 (1971), which authorizes a return of
32% on a $300 12-month loan, 20% on a $1000 12-month loan, and 240% for a
$30 one-month loan. See Comment, The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Revolving Charge
Accounts and Usury, 10 HOUSTON I.. REV. 140 (1972); Comment, Consumer Credit
Regulation in Texas-The Case for the Consumer, 49 TExAs L. REV. 1011 (1971).

PROPERTY

1974]

laws do not apply. 125 Hopefully, the next session of the legislature will at
least produce a bill sanctioning the commercial-consumer separation, perhaps in the form of a redrafted version of the demised Senate Bill No.
209.126
125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 67(4) (1972) (no interest limitation on loans
of $100,000 or more); GA. CODE ANN. § 57-119 (1971) (no interest limitation on
loans of $100,000 or more); N.J. REV. STAT. § 31:101 (Supp. 1974) (no interest limitation on loans of $50,000 or more unless the security is the dwelling of the borrower);
Oruo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page Supp. 1973) (no interest limitation on loans
over $100,000).

See also CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 3709 (1973)

(no interest limita-

tion on various categories of loans including real estate mortgages over $5,000); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 72, § 4 (Supp. 1974) (no interest limitation on various categories of
loans including a loan classified as a "business loan").
126. The author's suggestion for a revised § 1(b), which was clearly the more important section of Senate Bill No. 209, is set out below:
Section 1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5069-1.01 shall be and the same is
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a new section (f) to read as
follows:
§ 1.01 (f) "Exempt Transaction" means any transaction involving the
use or forbearance or detention of money in which one or more of the
following situations exist: (1) the use or forbearance or detention of
money is effected pursuant to a bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation under which the original outstanding principal balance is at
least $100,000.00; or (2) the use or forbearance or detention of money
is effected pursuant to a bona fide commitment in which the total sum
of money which may reasonably be expected to be used or forborne or
detained is at least $100,000.00, and the initial advance pursuant to the
commitment is at least $50,000.00; or (3) the indebtedness created by
the use or forbearance or detention of money is effected pursuant to
a bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation under which the original outstanding principal balance is at least $50,000.00, and the indebtedness thereby created is not secured by the residential homestead of
any individual accepting such use or forbearance or detention; or (4)
the person accepting such use or forbearance or detention of money
is not an individual and the indebtedness is created for a business purpose pursuant to a bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation under
which the original outstanding principal balance is at least $5,000.00.
Section 2. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-1.02 shall be and the same is
hereby amended in full to read as follows:
1.02 Maximum rates of interest. Except as otherwise fixed by law,
the maximum rate of interest shall be ten per cent per annum on all
use or forbearance or detention of money other than an exempt transaction. A greater rate of interest than ten per cent per annum shall
be deemed usurious unless charged in connection with an exempt transaction or unless otherwise authorized by law. All contracts for usury
. . . [same as current statutory provision].
Section 3. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-1.04 shall be and the same is
hereby amended in full to read as follows:
1.04 Limit on rate. The parties to any exempt transaction may agree
to and stipulate for any rate of interest. The parties to any other
written contract may agree to and stipulate for . . . [same as current

statutory provision].
Section 4. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1302-2.09 shall be and the same is
hereby amended in full to read as follows:
2.09 Authority of certain corporations to borrow money. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, corporations, domestic or foreign,
may agree to and stipulate for any rate of interest as such corporation
may determine, on any bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation
. . . [same as the current statutory provision].
The author's suggested substitute for section 1(a), the "spreading" section of Senate Bill
No. 209, discards the concept of "spreading" and returns to the concept espoused in
Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937), that front-end interest
charges are not considered interest at the commencement of the loan but rather are
deemed to reduce the "sum actually loaned" (quoting from the Nevels decision) for
determining the interest rate:
Section 1. Section (a) of TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-1.01 shall
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Usury Cases. Two cases decided since the last survey should be noted
more for what may be inferred from the written opinions than for what was
expressed. In Sud v. Morris 27' an individual plaintiff sued to recover usur-

ious interest (the court computed an effective interest rate in excess of fifteen percent per annum) paid on a promissory note which had been cosigned by the plaintiff and a corporation. 1 28 The defendants answered by
a plea of abatement alleging, in part, that the corporate co-maker was a

necessary party to the suit. On appeal the court held that because the loan
was not usurious as to the corporation, the individual plaintiff could sue
without joining as co-plaintiff the corporate co-maker. In Texas Tool
Traders v. W.E. Grace Manufacturing Co.1 29 -the court of civil appeals held
that a corporation had contracted to pay usurious interest and awarded recovery to that corporation in accordance with its computation of the interest
charged. The Supreme Court of Texas has recently modified the lower
court's opinion 30 in what may be a significant usury decision,1 3 1 but in no
way negating the conclusions of this Article. Although not expressed in
either opinion, the courts-which seem to have been the first courts to rule
on the 1967 corporate usury statute' 82-appeared
to have assumed, first,
that loans to corporations may bear interest at the rate of one and one-half
be and the same is hereby amended in full to read as follows:
1.01 (a) "Interest" is the compensation allowed by law for the use or
forbearance or detention of money; provided, however, that compensation paid on or before the date of initial use or forbearance or detention of money in any transaction regulated by this chapter, shall not
be deemed "interest" for purposes of this chapter, even if it is classified as interest by the parties to the transaction or if it otherwise
would be subject to classification as interest under the laws of this
state. The term "interest" shall not include any time price differential however denominated arising out of a credit sale.
Section 2. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-1.01 shall be and the same is
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a new section (f) [or section
(g) if the definition of "exempt transaction" is enacted as section (f)]
to read as follows:
1.01(f) "Interest Base" shall mean the sum actually used or forborne or detained, and upon which interest is to be calculated for purposes of this chapter. The "interest base" in any transaction regulated by this chapter shall be reduced by compensation paid on or before the date of initial use or forbearance or detention of money if
such compensation is classified as interest by the parties to the transaction or if such compensation would have been subject to classification
as interest under the laws of this state if it had not been excluded pursuant to section (a) of this article.
127. 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
128. Although, as the court pointed out, no proof had been shown that the comaker, MPS Production Company, was a corporation, the court assumed that fact from
the record.
129. 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), aff'd as modified, sub nom.
W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (1974).
130. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co. v. Levin, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (1974).
131. In distinguishing its 1930 decision in Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit
Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), the supreme court seems to have corroborated the Fifth Circuit's Frenchman's Creek decision as to the effect of a "saving
clause" on the "spreading" of interest. See note 116 supra, and accompanying text.
132. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302, § 2.09 (Supp. 1974). For cases in
which the new statutory provision was advanced by one of the litigants but not considered in the court's decision, see Larson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 75-76 (1973).
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percent per month,13 3 and secondly, that the statutory corporate rate of "one
and one-half percent per month" is no more restrictive than a rate of eighteen percent per annum.13 4 On the other hand, the Sud v. Morris decision
should remind lenders that, in situations where loans are made to corporate
borrowers but are guaranteed by individuals, such guarantors being denied
the defense of usury, l3 5 the guaranty should not be subject to an interpretation that the guarantor is a primary obligor.
One final case, Maloney v. Andrews,136 dealt with whether a lease provision calling for the payment of late charges constitutes a contract for "interest" as defined by article 5069-1.01.0137 The unequivocal answer of the
court was negative, with the court stating that interest considerations were
not present in a rental arrearage when the landlord's forbearance was clearly
involuntary. Unfortunately, the court did not review the case of Alexander
v. Golden West Free Press, Inc.138 which held that when no late charge or
interest was specified in a lease, the landlord was entitled to statutory interest. Although the earlier case was decided under different constitutional
and statutory provisions, the similarity of relevant language in the previous
and current provisions indicates that the two court decisions may be in conflict. 139
Mortgages. Mortgage litigation generally focuses on questions of foreclosure, and the past year was no exception. In two cases courts affirmed
the well-established principle that a foreclosure sale will not be voided
133. This question has not caused concern to lenders and certainly does not seem
to have impeded the making of high-interest loans to corporations; however, writers at
times have questioned whether the 1967 statute fully complies in all technical respects
with the constitutional permission to the legislature to "classify loans and lenders, license and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest." TEx.
CONST. art. XVI, § 11. See Loiseaux, supra note 114, at 438; Pearce & Williams, supra
note 114, at 254. Although not presented to the supreme court in Grace Mfg., the
question does seem to have received a tacit answer by the court's comment: "[C]orporations are now authorized to stipulate for any rate of interest not in excess of 1 A% per
cent per month .... ." 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 171.
134. This question has been of slightly more concern than the question of constitutionality because only the corporate usury statute uses a monthly percentage instead of
an annual percentage. Presumably, the choice of time periods was merely an attempt
to "talk the language" of standard loan amortization schedules, with perhaps some
added statutory assurance that collecting monthly installments of 1 1%per month
could never be interpreted as collecting more than 18% per annum. For cases in
which this latter possibility was advanced but rejected by Texas courts, see Shropshire
v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930); Vela v. Shackett,
12 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), judgment affirmed. On the other hand,
the legislature's choice of time periods could be disconcerting in loans where interest
rates vary considerably from month to month but never exceed 18% per annum. In
this regard, however, note the court of civil appeals' comment in Grace Mfg.: "Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1302-2.09, provides that a corporation may contract to pay
interest at a rate not to exceed 1 % per month, or 18% per annum." 488 S.W.2d
at 501. Although the supreme court opinion does not contain such a clear statement,
the opinion does make use of annual rates in its analysis.
135. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1973).
136. 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
137. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 (1971).
138. 363 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960).
139. Former art. 5070, which was in effect during the Alexander litigation and
which is repeated verbatim in current art. 5069-1.03, permitted 6% interest "when no
specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties .......
See TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (1971).
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merely because the property was sold for a price well below fair market
value. 140 And in French v. May141 the court reached back to apply 1892
precedent142 to uphold a trustee's sale, even though the deed of trust specified that the property was to be sold for cash and the actual sale had been
partially on credit. The court's holding appears to demonstrate that although
a non-judicial foreclosure sale normally must comply in all details with the
provisions of the deed of trust,143 when a deviation from such prescriptions
actually enhances the position of the debtor 144 the court may be willing to
45
except to the general rule.'
Two cases during the survey year dealt with actions for wrongful foreclosure. In Calverly v. Gunstream146 the court held that the ten-year statute
of limitations for setting aside foreclosure sales' 47 does not apply to a suit
for damages for wrongful foreclosure. In Boswell v. Hughes 48 the court,
apparently in a case of first impression, held that even if the defendant's
wrongful foreclosure had been actuated by malice, as the jury had found,
the plaintiff's remedy was in contract instead of tort, and, therefore, the
plaintiff could not receive exemplary damages. The dissent interpreted the
particular foreclosure involved in the case as "an action sounding in tort"
and argued that exemplary damages were justified. To be sure, the majority
opinion does seem to draw the line between contract and tort in a manner
which perhaps unduly favors treatment as a contract.
Finally, although the case of Yeager Electric & Plumbing Co. v. Gaines
Building, Inc.' 49 may be somewhat peculiar in its facts, it does serve to emphasize the value of recitations, even self-serving recitations, in purchase
money and refinancing loan documents. In that case a mortgage was
deemed inferior to a simultaneously effective mechanic's lien, in part because the record showed "no provisions in any of the [mortgage] documents
concerning vendor's lien . . .purchase money mortgage, or subrogation of

one lien [,the mortgage in question] to any other lien [the mortgage which
was released on the day the property was conveyed to the grantor of the
mortgage]."' 0 Although acknowledging that purchase money liens prevail
140. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Elledge, 463 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1972)

(sales price was barely more than one-third the alleged fair market value); Mitchell

v. Foster, 492 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (sales

price was barely more than one-half the alleged fair market value); see Tarrant Say.

Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965), where the Supreme
Court of Texas repeated the general rule that "mere inadequacy of consideration alone
[a $1,200 purchase price when the alleged value of the property was $4,000] does not

render a foreclosure sale void if the sale was legally and fairly made."

141. 484 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
142. Chase v. First Nat'l Bank, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 20 S.W. 1027 (1892).
143. See 39 TEX. JUR. 2D Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 144 (1962).

144. In this case, the purchase on credit relieved the debtor of any deficiency
claim.

145. Cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1962), where

the Supreme Court of Texas held that the trustee should have given a potential buyer
"a little time" to obtain the cash purchase price after having bid the highest price at
the foreclosure sale. 359 S.W.2d at 904.
146. 497 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
147. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5523a (1958).
148. 491 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973), error ref. n.r.e.

149. 492 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
150. Id. at 923.
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over simultaneously effective mechanics' and materialmen's liens, 151 and although not denying that subrogation of priority is a well established rule of
property law in this state,' 52 the court's review of the transaction led it to
conclude that the lender had not preserved either of such potential advantages.
Master Mortgage Legislation. In an attempt to reduce mortgage recording
costs and to conserve time and space in the recording process, the 63d
Legislature enacted a new article 6626b of the civil statutes, which authorizes a lender to record in county records a "master form of a mortgage or
of a deed of trust" and then incorporate into later instruments "any or all
of the provisions of such a master form . . .by reference."'

53

This legisla-

tion, which appears not to represent any radical legal concept but rather
is merely a statutory embellishment to an existing common-law principle of
incorporation by reference, has already been given adequate review and
154
commentary.
UCC Fixture Amendments. Certain provisions affecting fixture filing, included in the 1973 amendments to the Texas Business and Commerce Code
(Texas' version of the Uniform Commercial Code), deserve emphasis in a
real estate context. Specifically, sections 9.313 and 9.402 of the Code have
been substantially revised in an attempt to give more certainty to security
interests in hybrid property, i.e., property which is neither clearly realty nor
clearly personalty and is often called a "fixture."' 155 Although the new section 9.313 still defers to the real estate law of the state for a definition of
"fixture,"' 15 6 it does go substantially further than the prior section in determining relative priorities between the holder of a UCC security interest in

the specific fixture item, and the mortgagee of the real estate to which the
item has been affixed. The secured party is given relative priority in most
cases where its security interest is a purchase money security interest arising

before the goods become fixtures, and the secured party complies with certain filing requirements.' 57 The main exceptions are the secured party's inferior position (1) during construction, to a construction mortgage, specified as such in the recorded documentation and filed prior to when the goods
151. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
152. Gant v. Stewart, 347 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961), error ref. n.r.e.
See also Lewis v. Investors Say. Ass'n, 411 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1967).
153. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6626b (Supp. 1973).
154. Howeth, Master Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, 35 TEx. B.J. 1125 (1972); Saunders, 1973 Legislation: Real Estate Probate & Trust Law, 36 TEX. B.J. 898, 900
(1973); 12 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETrR OF THE REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW SECTION 1-2 (1973).

155. For recent commentary on the success of the drafters' attempt, compare
Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1973), with Lloyd, Proposed
Revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code Seek Uniformity on Fixtures, 2 REAL

ESTATE L.J. 444 (1973).

For preamendment articles relating to unique "fixture" prob-

lems, see Cosway, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Sw. L.J. 713
(1967), and Hamilton, Integration of UCC Fixture Filings with the Real Estate Recordation System-Recent Developments, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1175 (1967).
156. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(a)(1) (Supp. 1974). But see note

160 infra, and accompanying text for a possible inadvertent expansion of this term.
157.

TEX. Bus.& COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.313(d)(1) (Supp. 1973).
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become fixtures, and (2) after construction, to the extent that the mortgage
is given to refinance a construction mortgage which was prior to the secured
party's interest. 15 8 The secured party is given absolute priority, even over
the holder of a construction mortgage, in certain instances where the security
interest is prior in filing, where the contractual right of removal has been
granted, or where "the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances which are
consumer goods, and before the goods become fixtures the security interest
is perfected by any method permitted by this chapter [i.e., either fixture
filing or central filing with the secretary of state]."' 15 9 With -the exception
of the quoted provision, embodied in subsection 9.313(d)(3), these absolute priority qualifications appear to be quite clearly explained in the Code
provisions. The latter provision, although commendable in its evident purpose-to remove the ambiguity of filing requirements for certain "readily
removable" items-may create unfortunate negative presumptions of fixture
filing requirements for other "readily removable" items which were not included in the subsection and may not otherwise even have been vulnerable
to inclusion in the category of "fixture," such as the following: factory or
office equipment; and residential equipment, machines, and appliances
which are not consumer goods. 16 0
Section 9.402 of the Code effects substantial changes in fixture filing requirements. First, -the section provides that a mortgage is effective as a
UCC fixture filing if the goods are described in the mortgage by item or
type and are to become fixtures related to the real estate described in the
mortgage and if the mortgage is duly recorded and is in compliance with
the prescribed form of a fixture financing statement, other than the requirement of a recital that it is to be filed in the real estate records. 16' The
new provisions prescribing the form of a fixture financing statement require
the following: (1) a statement that the security is or is to become a fixture, (2) a recital that the statement is to be filed for record in the real
estate records, (3) a description of the real estate "sufficient if it were contained in a mortgage of the real estate to give constructive notice of the
mortgage,"' 6 02 and (4) if the debtor does not have an interest of record in
63
the real estate, the name of the record owner.'
158. Id. §§ 9.313(a)(3), (f) (Supp. 1973).
159. Id. §§ 9.313(d)(2)-(4), 9.313(e) (Supp. 1973).
160. Even Mr. Coogan, one of the drafters of the new art. 9, admits that the provision was not drafted properly. See Coogan, supra note 155, at 495-98.
161. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(f) (Supp. 1974). Moreover, the
mortgage is effective as a fixture filing without regard for the five-year maximum effective period prescribed in subsection 9.403(b) of the Code. Id. § 9.403(f) (Supp.
1974).
162. Id. § 9.402(e). The quoted section of this provision evidently takes precedence over § 9.110 of the Code which provides: "For the purposes of this Chapter
any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." For a case during the survey year
in which this requirement (similar under the prior Code provisions) was not deemed
satisfied by listing the real estate in the section where the debtor's address was requested, see Home Sav. Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 486 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
163. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(e) (Supp. 1974). Subsection 9.403
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Finally, it should be noted that as of the date this Article goes to the
printer the attorney general is preparing an option as to whether fixture
financing statements must be acknowledged, despite the absence of an acknowledgment requirement in the Code.'1 4 The attorney general's opinion
should be published by the date of publication of this Article, and fixture
financing statements should be prepared and filed in accordance with that
opinion.
Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens. For the second consecutive legislative session the Texas Legislature reacted in remedial fashion to an opinion
by the Supreme Court of Texas by legislatively revoking that opinion. 165 In
this instance the legislature responded to Hayek v. Western Steel Co.' 66 in
which the supreme court had held that article 5469, the statutory retainage
provision,' 67 required owners to hold back from their contractors during
construction a retainage of ten percent of the total improvement cost instead
of merely ten percent of a particular contract for specific work. The response was not an amendment of article 5469 but rather was an amendment
to section 2 of article 5452, the definitional section.' 68 This amendment
changes the statutory definition of "work" to that "which is performed pursuant to an original contract, as that term is defined herein" and adds a
definition of "contract price" which limits costs to those incurred "pursuant
to an original contract, as that term is defined herein."' 69 Article 5469 requires the owner to retain ten percent of -the "contract price" of "work" done
whereby a mechanic's or materialman's lien may be claimed; and so the
legislature's restriction of those terms, by its amendments to section 2 of arti(g) complements this requirement by prescribing that the county clerk shall index the
fixture filing under the names of the debtor and any owner of record shown on the
financing statement.
164. Subsection 9.403(g) provides that the fixture filing "shall be filed for record
and the filing officer shall index it under the names of the debtor and any owner of
record shown on the financing statement in the same fashion as if they were the mortgagors in a mortgage of the real estate .... ." In light of this provision, county clerks
have justifiably been confused as to whether: (1) fixture filings are to be maintained
in separate UCC records but indexed in the real property records index; (2) fixture
filings are to be maintained in the real property records and therefore must be acknowledged in the same manner as other recorded documents; (3) fixture filings are to be
maintained in the real property records and constitute an exception to the acknowledgment requirement. The request for attorney general's opinion, Request No. 484 which
was submitted by the county attorney of Travis County, asks for an opinion on correct filing procedures and the appropriate filing fee. [Editors Note: On April 29, 1974,
the attorney general issued opinion No. H-288, indicating that alternative (3) is the
correct interpretation of the relevant statutes.]
165. In 1971 the Texas Legislature amended art. 5459 in response to Irving Lumber
Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (1971), withdrawn and new decision entered, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971). See discussions of this court-prompted legislation in Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665,
691-95 (1972), and in Johnson & Barbee, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26
Sw. L.J. 24 (1974).
166. 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972), analyzed in Youngblood, supra note 165, at 68586, and in Hemingway, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 18 (1973).
167. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1974). See generally Youngblood,
supra note 165, at 682-87, 707.
168. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Supp. 1974). The relationship of the
Hayek decision and the instant statutory revision is analyzed in 11 HOUSTON L. REV.
185 (1973).
169. Emphasis added. The term "original contract" is defined in the following subsection of art. 5452, § 2, as "an agreement to which the owner is a party."
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cle 5452, seems effectively to have shielded courts from the quandary, described in the vigorous dissent in Hayek, 70° of charging the wrongful failure
of a late-phase "original contractor" (e.g., roofer) to pay its subcontractors
against either an innocent owner or an innocent early-phase "original contractor" (e.g., foundation contractor). Under the new statutory provision
the owner may pay the foundation contractor in full thirty days after completion of its work, and subcontractors under the roofer will be limited in
their retainage fund to ten percent of the roofing "original contract." On
the other hand, as indicated in the majority opinion in Hayek, the legislative
revision may well result in increased litigation caused by owners' schemes
to change a single turn-key "original contract" into multiple ones in order
to avoid the need for a continuing retainage requirement. To some extent,
the statutory sham-contract provision 17' added in 1965 may protect subcontractors in those instances where the owner executes multiple "original contracts" with its own alter ego; however, this statute will be of little assistance
when the owner and a single third party general contractor (not a statutory
term, but one readily recognized in the construction industry) agree that the
latter will contract for the work in phases through separate entities, each
of which will execute an "original contract." Moreover, even in cases suited
for application of the sham-contract provision, a subcontractor will likely be
faced with a jury trial before it can recover.1 7 2 This new potential source
of litigation could probably be cured by an amendment to the sham-contract
provision which incorporates the multiple-entity arrangement into its sanctions and which perhaps even creates a statutory presumption of sham in
certain instances (e.g., more than two "original contracts" with individuals
or entities which are related through ownership or interlocking directorships). Hopefully, though, a legislative session in the near future will not
be content with patchwork amelioration of unsatisfactory statutory provisions, but rather will review proposals for a complete recodification of this
173
area of the law.
Mechanic's lien litigation during the survey year was generally founded on
established principles; 17 4 however, Panhandle Bank & Trust Co. v. Graybar
170. 478 S.W.2d at 796.
171. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452-1 (Supp. 1973).
172. Compare United Distrib. of Texas, Inc. v. Riggs Properties, Inc., 496 S.W.2d
719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973) (summary judgment against subcontractor was reversed and case remanded for factual determination of relationship between owner and
original contractor), with Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 412 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967), error ref. n.r.e. (dicta) (the record did not establish
sham relationship as a matter of law).
173. "The development of our mechanic's lien laws has been a relentless progression
from the simple to the complex, which is not to be equated with qualitative progress.
To reverse the direction will be a prodigious undertaking, but it will be worth the effort." Youngblood, supra note 165, at 707.
174. See Dowdy v. Hale Supply Co., 498 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973) (statutory attorney's fees not applicable when subcontractor sues owner with
whom it had no direct contractual relationship; thirty-day filing requirement in article
5469 is not applicable when owner did not retain the prescribed 10% retainage);
United Distrib. of Texas, Inc. v. Riggs Properties, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1973); Herrington v. Luce, 491 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1973) (notice prescribed in statute is a condition precedent to the validity of the lien
claim by a subcontractor); Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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Electric Co.17 5 appears to be the first state decision to interpret article
5472e, the trust fund statute. 176 In its opinion the court reviewed favorably
a previous federal decision 177 which had given article 5472e "broad construction to effectuate its protective purposes" and held that compliance with
the other mechanics' and materialmen's lien laws was not a prerequisite to
beneficiary status for the trust funds constituted as such by that article.
IV.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

Governmental Land Use Restrictions. Although few additional govern-

mental restrictions on real estate development in Texas became effective
during the survey year, the year was certainly a "year of awakening," leaving many developers with a feeling of paranoia that all branches of local,
state, and federal government were bearing down on them.

Of course, the

concept of governmental restrictions on land use is not a new concept. At
least since 1926 when the United States Supreme Court decided Village of

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' 78 courts have recognized the state's right to
protect its citizenry through reasonable land use controls. 179 Moreover, proposals for increased state and federal governmental regulation have been asserted in academic publications for several years,' 80 have been adopted in
recent years by state governments,' 8 ' and have been evident (although often
[lst Dist.] 1972) (a purchaser of property on which there are newly constructed improvements is under a duty to determine whether there are any outstanding mechanics'
and materialmen's liens against the property); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas
Co., 486 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (the "inception"
theory of Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895), held inapplicable to the facts of the instant case).
175. 492 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
176. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5 472e (Supp. 1973), which provides in part
that all monies or funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor under a construction contract constitute trust funds for the benefit of contractors and subcontractors. See
Youngblood, supra note 165, at 687.
177. Owens v. Drywall & Acoustical Supply Corp., 325 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Tex.
1971).
178. 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in which the Supreme Court upheld a municipality's
comprehensive zoning ordinance against legal attacks founded on U.S. CONST. amend.

xIVy.

179. For Texas authority, see City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275
S.W.2d 477 (1955); Darnall v. City of Austin, 451 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Wingo, Local Government, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 187, 193 (1971).
See also Hunt v. City of San Antonio,
462 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1971), discussed in Nichols, Local Government, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 213, 219-20 (1972).
180. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 5 COLUM. L.
REV. 650 (1958); Freilich, Model Regulations for the Control of Land Subdivision, 36
Mo. L. REV. 1 (1971); Harr, Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 515 (1957); Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 317 (1955); Symposium, Public Regulations of Land Use, 8 REAL
PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 509 (1973); Symposium, Environmental Law, 19 WAYNE
L. REV. 73 (1972); Report, Variations in Land Use Controls, 1 REAL PROP., PROBATE
& TRUST J. 431 (1966). See also ALI, MODEL LAND DEV. CoDE (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1968) (now in its third draft, dated April 22, 1971).
181. Probably the first state to adopt a statewide land use policy was Hawaii in
1961. HAWAII REV. STATS. §§ 205-1 to -15 (1968). Other state regulations have been
much more recent. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Conservation Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 27000 (West 1972); Environmental Land and Water Management Act, 14 FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 380 (1972); Environmental Management Act, IND. CODE § 35-5201-65 (Supp.
1974); Site Location of Development Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 (Supp.
1974); Zoning Appeals Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 20 (Supp. 1974); En-
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only subtly so) in a plethora of federal acts.' 82 However, before the beginning of the survey year most observers felt that governmental restrictions
on private developers in Texas lay off in the distant future. This complacency was mildly upset early in the survey year with the judicial decision
in National Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Environmental Protection

Agency,' 83 in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to speed up and intensify its review of state implementation plans for enforcing the national ambient air quality standards prescribed by the Clean Air Amendments of
1970. 184 The response of the EPA to that judicial order, soon followed by
other land-use legislative activity at state and federal levels, transformed the
developers' former complacency into turbulence.
EPA "Indirect Source" Regulations. Prior to the National Resources De-

fense Council decision, pronouncements from the EPA were limited to the
improvements of air quality through control of transportation polluters (such
as automobiles) and direct stationary polluters (such as smelter plants).
Shortly after that decision, however, the EPA shocked the real estate industry by publishing an advance notice of draft regulations affecting "indirect

sources" 18 5 such as highways and airports, shopping centers, sports complexes or stadiums, large parking facilities, and large amusement and recreational facilities. Unlike the direct stationary polluter, which is defined as
a "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act,' 86 the term "indirect source" is

not contained in the Act. The EPA, however, has authority under section
110(a) (2) (B) of the Act to reject a state implementation plan if such plan
does not contain "such other measures as may be necessary . . . including,
but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls.' u8 7 The EPA,
vironmental Protection Act, MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1201-07 (Supp. 1974); Environmental Control Law, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-89 (Supp. 1974); Shoreland Zoning Law, Wis. STAT. § 59.971 (Supp. 1974). See also Rose, From the Legislatures:
State Governnent Role in Land Use Planning and Control is Growing, 2 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 809 (1974); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Approaches,
56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972).
182. Those acts which come closest to implementing land-use controls on private developers are as follows: the Clean Air Act of 1955, as amended by the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (Supp. 1974); the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (Supp. 1974); and to a lesser degree, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, as amended by the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1974). Two others appear at
present to be limited to governmental control of its own actions: The National Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); and the Environmental Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4371 (1970). See also the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1968, as amended by the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, 49 U.S.CA. § 1653
(Supp.1974).
183. 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
184. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-4, -5 (Supp. 1974). For the promulgation in 1971 of
both the national ambient air quality standards and the procedures for preparation and
review of state implementation plans, see 40 C.F.R. parts 50 and 51 (1972).
185. The term used in the advance notice was "complex sources." 38 Fed. Reg.
6279 (Mar. 8, 1973). Although many commentators still refer to this original term,
it was deleted in the proposed regulations and the final regulations, the term "indirect
sources" being substituted. 38 Fed. Reg. 9599 (April 18, 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 15834
(June 18, 1973); and 39 Fed. Reg. 7270 (Feb. 25, 1974).
186. The term "stationary source" is defined in the Act as "any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1857c6(a)(3) (Supp. 1974).
187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1974).
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therefore, not only has issued "transportation" regulations which were always
expected,' 88 but also has issued "indirect source" regulations' 89 which were
not anticipated a year ago. Inasmuch as the final "indirect source" regulations were promulgated after the end of the survey year and do not become
effective until January 1, 1975, a complete discussion of their implementation will be reserved for next year's Survey issue.' 90 However, real estate
developers should be aware that the regulations require governmental approval
for all urban construction commenced after January 1, 1975, which will
create a new parking area for 1,000 cars or more (2,000 if in a non-urban
location), or which will increase an existing parking area by 500 cars or
more (1,000 cars or more, if in a non-urban location). The EPA has urged
the states to assume the responsibility for such "governmental approval," but
inasmuch as the attorney general of Texas has already assured the Texas
Air Quality Control Board (AQCB) that it need not accept this political
hot-potato role, 191 until additional state legislation is passed the EPA will
likely be the reviewing authority.
Senate Bill 268. On June 21, 1973, the United States Senate passed Senate Bill 268, which, if passed by the House of Representatives, 192 will be enacted under the title of the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act.
Because this legislation has not been passed by the House, it will not be
analyzed in depth in this Article. However, a few comments do seem warranted. First, Senate Bill 268 does not impose mandatory land-use controls
but merely encourages 193 the states to identify areas of critical environmental concern' 9 4 and critical land uses, 19 5 regulate the land-use activities of local
188. Not even all of the transportation regulations were expected. For example, the
"Texas Transportation Control Plan" issued by the EPA at the end of the survey year
restricts construction in the "Houston-Galveston Intrastate Region" (the only region in
the state so restricted) of any "parking facility with parking capacity for 500 or more
motor vehicles" without prior written approval from the EPA (or a state or local
agency approved by the EPA). 38 Fed. Reg. 30626, 30749 (Nov. 6, 1973). The effective date of the parking restrictions, however, has been postponed until Jan. 1, 1975.
39 Fed. Reg. 1848 (Jan. 15, 1974). In addition, these restrictions are being challenged
in Congress and in the courts. See, e.g., State of Texas v. Environmental Protection
Agency, Case No. 73-3540 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(case in progress; no reported opinion to date).
189. 39 Fed. Reg. 7270 (Feb. 25, 1974).
190. In fact, the EPA has announced that it will also require comprehensive state
"air quality maintenance plans" and "significant deterioration plans," either or both of
which could seriously affect real estate development. Of course, as with any sensitive
social or economic issue, the EPA "indirect source" regulations are likely to receive
lobbyist opposition and judicial challenges from both sides, e.g., National Resources Defense Council (which already has filed an administrative review request, and has in
the past sought to obtain EPA review for all parking facilities with more than a tencar capacity) and the International Council of Shopping Centers (participating with the
State of Texas in the litigation referenced at note 188 supra).
191. TEx. A= GEN. Op. No. H-222 (1974).
192. The House version, H.R. 10294, is quite similar to Senate Bill 268. The major
difference appears to be the House bill's imposition of sanctions (by denial of federal
monies, and possibly even by imposition of federal land-use regulations) upon states
which do not comply with the statutory requirements; however, a non-sanction version
is also being considered by the House.
193. Or demands of the states, depending on whether the final version of the act
includes sanctions as discussed in note 192 supra.
194. This concept includes both fragile lands (such as coastal plains, flood plains,
and forests) and key facilities (such as airports, highway interchanges, and large utilities).
195. This concept includes vital institutions (such as hospitals, schools, and perhaps
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governments in the small percentage of cases involving "areas of critical environmental concern" and "critical land uses" the impacts of which extend
beyond local jurisdictions, and provide appeal mechanisms for affected parties who are dissatisfied by local rulings.' 9 6 Second, if passed into law,
Senate Bill 268 will be administered by the Department of -the Interior. By
itself, this aspect of the bill is not particularly worthy of comment; however,
its importance becomes apparent in light of the administrators specified in
other federal land-use laws: e.g., Environmental Protection Agency (Clean
Air Act); the Department of Commerce (Coastal Zone Management Act);
Army Corps of Engineers (Water Control Act); Council on Environmental
Quality (National Environmental Policy Act and Environmental Quality Improvement Act). 197 Especially if combined with the presence of local administrators and the potential presence of administrators under imminent
state legislation, the inability of federal enactments to select a single landuse authority creates the specter of a regulatory octopus with which a real
estate developer must tangle each time he wishes to consummate a single
project.
State Legislation. Although not completely passive in environmental concerns, 198 the 63d Legislature rejected two attempts to enact comprehensive
land-use legislation. 199 Nevertheless, with federal monetary encouragement
imminent for cooperating states,2 00 and with the equally imminent possibility
of federal regulations being imposed upon non-cooperating states,'20 1 the next
session of the legislature will certainly give more serious consideration to
such legislation.
even certain housing projects), large scale developments (such as large regional shopping centers and major industrial complexes), and large residential subdivisions.
196. In these aspects, Senate Bill 268 bears a rather close resemblance to ALI
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).

197. See note 182 supra.
198. See the Coastal Public Lands Management Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5415e-1 (Supp. 1974), which constitutes an explicit state corollary to the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (Supp. 1974), and which
gives the Texas General Land Office a considerable degree of land-use management authority in connection with a large portion of coastal lands. See also TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5421c-13 (Supp. 1974), which enables the School Land Board and the
commissioner of the General Land Office to trade state lands for private lands of at
least equal value in the event such private lands are deemed scenically, historically, or
archeologically superior. Cf. the Clean Air Financing Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4477-5a (Supp. 1974). For a review of land-use legislation for Texas navigation
districts prior to 1973, see Buchanan, Texas Navigation Districts and Regional Planning
in the Texas Gulf Coast Area, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 533 (1973).
199. Senate Bill No. 645, introduced by Senator A.R. "Babe" Schwartz of Galveston
and endorsed by the Texas General Land Office, would have set up a six-member land
use commission to function in a similar manner to that "encouraged" by federal Senate
Bill 268. It was defeated in the Senate Natural Resources Committee. A similar bill,
H.B. No. 1431, introduced in the house by Representatives Fred J. Agnich of Dallas
and Neal Caldwell of Alvin, was reported favorably out of the House Environmental
Affairs Committee but was not acted upon by the House. See generally In Search of
a Land Use Policy, The Texas Observer, Sept. 21, 1973, at 1; however, that article
incorrectly refers to Senate Bill No. 645 as Senate Bill No. 644.
200. See, e.g., notes 192-97 supra, and accompanying text. In fact, the Federal
Housing and Urban Development Agency has already funded considerable sums to the
state for the compilation of an eight-volume study entitled Texas Land Use, which was
completed during the survey year.
201. See, e.g., notes 192, 193 supra, and accompanying text.
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Private Restrictive Covenants. As usual, numerous cases during the survey
year involved the creation, duration, and effect of restrictive covenants. In
Burns v. Wood the Supreme Court of Texas held that restrictions contained
in a recorded subdivision plat and dedication instrument never sprang into
being because "[t]here was no evidence that the plan -reflected therein was
implemented pursuant to or in accordance with the recorded requirements,
or that the Subdivision as so cast ever came into existence. ' 202 Acknowledging that Texas law does recognize restrictive covenants imposed through
a "general scheme or plan," which in turn may be evidenced by a subdivision plat, 20 3 the court found that the plat was never adopted by owners of
the affected property, by deed reference or otherwise. The plat, therefore,
remained inert and ineffective--even though the deed conveying the questioned property to the defendant (against whom the restrictions were
claimed) described the property with reference to the subdivision named in
the plat. In Saccomanno v. Farb a Texas court acknowledged for the first
time the concept of "reciprocal negative easement," which applies in instances when a common owner of related parcels conveys one parcel and
includes restrictions evidencing "a scheme or intent that the entire tract
should be similarly treated. ' 20 4 In upholding a summary judgment in opposition to this concept, however, the court made clear its reluctance to consider the possibility of a "reciprocal negative easement" in anything other
than an obvious situation.
In Amason v. Woodman205 the supreme court gave additional assurance
to real estate transactions by standing firmly in favor of a bona fide purchaser in opposition to the restrictive covenant rights of parties not of record. The restrictive covenants for a subdivision had been released by all
record owners but not by three parties with equitable title, i.e., contracts to
purchase tracts within the subdivision. In reversing the court of appeals decision 20 6 the supreme court ruled that although the consent of equitable
owners is necessary to terminate restrictive covenants, subsequent purchasers
without actual notice of equitable interests may rely on the written release
of the record owners. Furthermore, in clear contradiction to the court of
appeals, the supreme court set the burden of proof squarely upon the equitable owners to prove that the subsequent purchasers had actual notice of
their position. In another case involving duration of restrictive covenants,
a court of appeals held that the instrument in question did not cause the
restriction to survive the signator's conveyance of the property which she had
restricted. 20 7
202. 492 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. 1973).
203. See Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 244 S.W. 497 (1922); City of Corsicana
v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317, 78 S.W. 924 (1904); Lamar County v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347
(1878); Texas & P. Ry. v. Chandler, 20 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929),
error ref.; cf. Anderson v. McRae, 495 S.W.2d 351, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973).
204. 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App,-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e. See also
20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 173, at 733 (1965).
205. 498 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1973).
206. Amason v. Woodman, 484 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), rev'd,
498 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1973).
207. Billington v. Riffe, 492 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973).
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The cases previously reviewed demonstrate a judicial reluctance to expand
the effect of restrictive covenants; however, this reluctance is not uniform.
In what appears to be an issue not previously decided in Texas, two courts
of civil appeals considered whether a restriction on certain land may be extended to abutting unrestricted land. In both cases the restricted land was
to serve as a parking area essential to a use on the unrestricted land which
violated the restriction. 208 In both cases the court extended the restriction
to the abutting unrestricted land. In one of these cases, H.E. Butt Grocery
Co. v. Justice, the court recognized and conscientiously documented the conflicting lines of authority in this area; 20 9 however, the court determined that
parking, ingress, and egress are so integral to a primary use that the restriction must be upheld despite the general rule that "any doubt or ambiguity
will be resolved against the restriction. ' 210 In three cases courts showed a
clear willingness to order affirmative relief against a violating property
owner, 21' even when, in one of such cases, Walker v. Vaughn, the violation
resulted in a more attractive residential structure than that required by the
restriction. 21 2 Finally, in Johnson v. Linton213 the court's thorough analysis
of law relating to architectural control committees formed the basis of its
holding that homeowners had complied with restrictions on their property
prior to remodeling their home. In that case the architectural control committee 21 4 had been duly selected by the entity specified in the restrictions;
and although the entity had later been dissolved, the court held under the
facts in the case that the architectural control committee continued in existence and had authority to approve the homeowners' remodeling.
V.

LANDLORD-TENANT

Legislation. Perhaps the most publicized real property legislation during
the survey year was that affecting residential leases. Although the 63d
Legislature did not enact reforms as extensive as those proposed in the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which has been approved by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 21 5 and is currently under considera-

tion by the American Bar Association, 210 two acts passed by the legislature
208. Smith v. Mobil Oil Corp., 495 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973);
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Justice, 484 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error
ref. n.r.e.
209. 484 S.W.2d at 631 n.1 and accompanying text.
210. Id. at 630.
211. Watkins v. Yancey, 495 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973) (court
ordered removal of church foundation); Walker v. Vaughn, 491 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (court ordered remodeling of residence to
conform with restrictions); Garden Oaks Board of Trustees v. Gibbs, 489 S.W.2d 133
(Tex. Civ App.-Houston [1st Dist.j 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (court ordered removal
of a fence and carport); cf. Coleman v. Forister, 497 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1973), discussed in notes 36, 37 supra, and accompanying text.
212. 491 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
213. 491 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973).
214. The "committee" was in fact a single individual.
215. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (Approved Draft, Jan. 31,
1973), reprintedat 8 REAL PROP., PROB. &.TRUST J. 125 (1973).
216. See the critique by a Report of Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant
Act of Committee on Leases (A.B.A.) at 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 104 (1973).
See also Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: A Departure
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will have a considerable-and in this author's opinion a beneficial-impact
2 17
on landlord-tenant relations in residential premises.
The statutory amendments will be discussed in the order in which they
218
have been codified:
Article 5236b. This article provides an equitable balance between certain landlords' desire for privacy and the tenants' need to locate a landlord's
agent for service of process. It does not require owners to reveal their identity to tenants but instead provides that if the owner's name and address or
that of the landlord's management company have not been furnished in writing to the tenant, then the tenant in any law suit shall be entitled to have
served the landlord's "on-premise manager, or rent collector serving such
dwelling unit."
Article 5236c. This article deprives landlords of certain self-help devices
such as the interruption of utilities paid for by the tenant directly to the
utility company and the exclusion of a tenant from the leased premises. It
does, however, grant the landlord a quite unique, although limited, self-help
remedy. A landlord may now change the door locks of a leased premises
when the tenant's rentals are delinquent in whole or in part; however, the
landlord must leave a written notice on the tenant's front door describing
where the new key may be obtained at any hour and giving the name of
the individual who will provide the tenant with the new key. Moreover, the
new key must be given to the tenant upon request, regardless of whether
the delinquency is cured. Essentially, this provision, which in the legislative
hearings was often referred to as the "eyeball-to-eyeball provision," merely
provides the landlord a legal means to arrange a personal confrontation with
a delinquent tenant. It may, however, prove to be a valuable right. The
article also permits the landlord to remove the contents of the premises when
the tenant has abandoned the premises and provides that a landlord's "bona
From Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 495 (1973); cf. Hicks,
The ContractualNature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 ('1972).
217. House Bill No. 877, ch. 433, [1973] Tex. Laws 1182 (enacted as article
5236e) and House Bill No. 1684, ch. 441, [1973] Tex. Laws 1226 (adding articles
5236b, 5236c and 5236d and repealing article 5238a). It should be noted that although

the substantive provisions of House Bill No. 1684 do not in all cases limit themselves
to residential leases, the statute's caption and effective date provisions clearly do con-

tain such limitations (it being urged that the following provisions be preserved in all
published versions of the statute):
Caption
An Act providing for service of process on agents of a residential land-

lord under certain circumstances; relating to the willful interruption of
utility services by a residential landlord; relating to the willful exclusion
of a tenant by a residential landlord; relating to residential landlord liens;

repealing all laws in conflict and specifically article 5238a, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes; adding articles 5236b, 5236c, and 5236d, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes; declaring an effective date; and providing a savings
clause.
Effective Date

This Act shall take effect on September 1, 1973, and shall apply to all
residential rental agreements, written or oral, executed or entered into
after such date.
(Emphasis added.) House Bill No. 877 is internally clear as to its being limited to
residential leases. Ch. 443, § 5236(e), [1973] Tex. Laws 1182.
218. The author wishes to express appreciation to the Texas Apartment Association,
Inc. for permitting him access to the "TAA Redbook," a recently-published analysis of
landlord-tenant laws which is being made available to Association members.
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fide repairs, construction, or emergencies" are exempted from the article's
coverage. Finally, the article lists statutory remedies for the landlord's
violations and precludes the modification by contract of the statutory rights,
liabilities, and duties contained in the article.
Article 5236d. In 1969 the 61st Legislature enacted article 5238a, generally referred to as "the baggage lien law" because it provided residential
landlords a lien and right of self-help similar to that of a hotelman. 219 In
1972 that provision was held to be unconstitutional in Hall v. Garson, a
22 0
case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The 63d Legislature expressly repealed -the former article 5238a and substituted article 5236d, which i; much more restrictive and, therefore, may
pass constitutional muster. The new article denies the landlord self-help
as to the tenant's property unless such right is granted in a written rental
agreement between the landlord and the tenant. Moreover, the article precludes the landlord from enforcing a contractual landlord's lien (and perhaps
any lien) 221 unless a provision is underlined or printed in conspicuous, bold
print. Even when a lien is duly authorized in the written rental agreement,
the article excludes thirteen categories of property as being exempt from the
landlord's lien. 222 Finally, the article expressly authorizes a landlord to remove the tenant's property from the leased premises when the tenant has
abandoned the premises.
Article 5236e. This article attempts to regulate, and therefore to curb
abuses in, the actions of both landlords and tenants with regard to security
deposits. The landlord is obligated to keep accurate records of all security
deposits, to refund the full amount of each security deposit (minus only
those itemized deductions of which the landlord notifies the tenant in writing) within thirty days after the tenant surrenders the premises and to assure
that when the premises are transferred to a new owner, such new owner
will deliver to the tenant a signed statement acknowledging that the new
owner has received and is responsible for the tenant's security deposit (with
an acknowledgment as to the exact amount of the tenant's security deposit).
The article does provide that the lease may condition the return of the tenant's security deposit upon the tenant's having given advance notice of
surrender of the premises; however, such lease provision in order to be effective must be underlined or printed in conspicuous, bold print in the rental
agreement. The tenant, too, has obligations. He is obligated to furnish the
219. For the statutory hotelman's lien, see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4594,
4595 (1960). See also Stalcup & Williams, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
24 Sw. L.J. 30, 32 (1970); 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (1973); 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 880
(1973).
220. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1972).
221. Although probably not the intent of the statute, art. 5236d (and specifically
§§ 4, 5) may not only preclude non.contractual self-help but may also be interpreted
as precluding any landlord's lien unless a contractual provision for such lien is included
in a written rental agreement and such provision is underlined or printed in conspicuous, bold print.
222. The list, although extensive, does not include televisions, stereos, records, musical instruments, certain paintings, typewriters, adding machines, calculators, certain
books, sewing machines, clocks, radios, motorcycles and bicycles (if found within the
tenant's dwelling or in the storage room), certain furniture, and sports equipment.
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landlord with a written copy of his forwarding address when he vacates the
premises and he is precluded from withholding payment of his last month's
rental, or any portion thereof, on the grounds that the security deposit serves
as security for the unpaid rental. The article further provides that its provisions apply to leases in which the parties are eighteen years of age or older.
Finally, the article lists statutory remedies for violations by a landlord or
a tenant and precludes the modification by contract of the statutory rights,
liabilities, and duties contained in the article.
Landlord-Tenant Cases. In Crowell v. Housing Authority225 -the Supreme
Court of Texas removed Texas from the list of states in which an exculpatory clause in a lease is given absolute recognition. Unfortunately, the
court's decision does not clearly delineate the extent of judicial rejection of
such clauses. In this particular case a tenant in a public housing complex
was alleged to have died as a result of carbon monoxide leaking from a
defective gas heater in his apartment. Because the lease between the de224
fendant and the deceased contained an unequivocal exculpatory clause,
the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. The court of
civil appeals affirmed the trial court, citing and quoting the 1957 opinion
by the Supreme Court of Texas, Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman,225 for the general principle that exculpatory clauses are recognized in this state, and refusng to accept the plaintiff's argument ,that the defendant's identity as a housing authority should prompt "public policy" considerations which override
the general principle. The supreme court reversed the lower courts, in part
upon the plaintiff's "public policy" allegations. However, the supreme court
did not stop with that concept, but rather chose to cite examples and include
references which imply that in any case where the parties are not at a relatively equal bargaining power the exculpatory clause might not be given
judicial recognition. Unfortunately, the supreme court has probably encouraged litigation in each instance of tenant loss or injury in order to determine
whether the parties were bargaining "from positions of substantially equal
strength" (in which case, according to the supreme court, "the agreement
is ordinarily enforced by the courts") or "where one party is at such a disadvantage in bargaining power that he is practically compelled to submit
to the stipulation" (in which case, again according to the supreme court,
"the exculpatory agreement will be declared void"). 226
Again during the survey year a Texas court considered the question of
what constitutes the landlord's acceptance of a "surrender of a lease" by
the tenant who vacates the leased premises. 227 It appears that after briefly
indulging in a concept which would have placed unrealistic obligations upon
an innocent landlord whose tenant vacates the leased premises before the
223.

495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973).

224. "[N]or shall the Landlord nor any of its representatives or employees be liable
for any damage to person or property of the Tenant, his family, or his visitors, which

might result from the condition of these or other premises of the Landlord, from theft
or from any cause whatsoever." Id. at 888-89.
225. 157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957).
226. 495 S.W.2d at 889.
227. Arrington v. Loveless, 486 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).
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end of the lease term (in some cases releasing the tenant from his contractual obligations under the lease if the landlord re-enters the premises without
actual consent from the tenant) 228 the Texas courts may have returned to
a position where the controlling issue is merely the intent of the landlord,
and the burden is placed upon the tenant to show that the landlord released
229
the tenant by accepting the tenant's surrender.
In two cases courts of civil appeals decided tough questions for which
there is a conflict of authority in Texas and various other jurisdictions in
the country. In Maloney v. Andrews 230 the court determined that a late
charge under a lease did not constitute interest and thus was not regulated
by either the constitutional or statutory provisions regarding usury.2 31 In
Nitschke v. Doggett2 3 2 the court rather reluctantly held that a lease which
specified that its term was "for the balance of the life of the tenant" was
at law a tenancy at will terminable at any time by either the landlord or
28
the tenant.
Finally, in Skinner v. HCC Credit Co. 28 4 the court reviewed a provision
in the lease which attempted to allocate condemnation proceeds between the
landlord and the tenant. The fact that the court acknowledged the proceeds-allocation provision to be ambiguous and subject to jury determination, and the fact that such provision (which is quoted in the court's opinion) is in fact clearer than that contained in many leases, should alert draftsmen to give serious thought to this provision in the early stages of lease
drafting.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

Conservation and Reclamation Districts. In Texas, a builder who develops

outside the perimeter of existing municipal utility sources may finance certain utility installation costs through the creation of its own "conservation
and reclamation district," a generic term which includes a "water district,"
a "municipal utility district" (often called a "MUD"), and other subclassifications. 23 5 Often the subject of consumer complaint in recent years, 23 6
228. See Comment, Lease Drafting and Surrender by Operation of Law, 41 TEXAs
L. REv. 428 (1963). See also Updegraff, The Element of Intent in Surrender by Operation of Law, 38 HARV. L. REV. 64 (1924), which was cited and quoted favorably
in the Arrington opinion. 486 S.W.2d at 607, 608.
229. See Maida v. Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 1971).
230. 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
231. See notes 136-39 supra, and accompanying text, for additional discussion of
this case.
232. 489 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Doggett v. Nitschke, 498 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1973).
233. The court's decision is consistent with that in Perren v. Baker Hotel, 228
S.W.2d 311, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1950), and with earlier cases in connection
with relevant principles of real property law. But as the court pointed out in its opinion, its holding is not consistent with the present attempt to view leases through the
perspective of contract law rather than real property law. 489 S.W.2d at 337. See
Note, Creation and Termination of Periodic Tenancies, 15

BAYLOR

L. REv. 329 (1963).

See also Mills v. Thomason, 211 So. 2d 790, 792 (La. Ct. App. 1968), in which under
a similar fact situation the court concluded: "The lease is not one in perpetuity. Its
fixed duration. . . would be at the death of appellant ....
234. 498 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).

235. TEx. CoNST. art. XVI, § 59; TEx. WATER CODE ANN.

§§ 50.001-56.311
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conservation and reclamation district operations were the source of nine bills
passed by the 63d Legislature. The focus of these bills was -threefold:
(i) adequate notice and information to consumers both before and after they
purchase property within the district, 237 (ii) elimination of conflict of interests on district governing bodies, 238 and (iii) increased supervision by the
Texas Water Rights Commission.
Creditor Seizures of Debtor Property. The effect of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.239 and
Fuentes v. Shevin2 40 on creditor pre-judgment seizure practices need not be
chronicled again in this Article; 241 however, two developments should be
noted. First, during the 63d Legislature the House of Representatives
passed House Bill 369 which, if enacted, would have amended the non-judicial deed of trust foreclosure statute242 to require that notice of foreclosure
sales be effected as follows: (i) posting (same as present practice although
only one posting, at the county courthouse door, would have been required),
(ii) newspaper advertisement, and (iii) delivery of a copy of the notice by
certified mail return receipt requested to the record owner and any inferior
lien holder of record. 243 House Bill 369 was not acted upon by the Senate;
therefore, the legislature has two more years to review the methods by which
non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures and other pre-judgment seizure practices may survive challenges based upon the Sniadach and Fuentes decisions. Secondly, in two federal court judgments rendered after the close of
the survey year the district courts each held that because non-judicial deed
(1972); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 7808-80 (Supp. 1973); id. tables I-IV; see
Comment, The Water Control and Improvement District: Concept, Creation and
Critique, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 712 (1971). The author of that Comment points out

that although there are 13 types of "water districts," the one most commonly utilized
is the water control and improvement district authorized by TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§§ 51.001-.836 (1972). However, the article was written before enactment of ch. 54,
tit. 4, of the Texas Water Code, entitled "Municipal Utility Districts." TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. §§ 54.001-.738 (1972).

236. See The Water District Mess, Texas Observer, Sept. 22, 1972, at 6; MUD
Run: A Primer, Texas Observer, Sept. 22, 1972, at 7; A Hearing in Houston, Texas
Observer, Dec. 1, 1972, at 7-8.
237. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 50.301 (Supp. 1974), which requires written

notice to a consumer at or prior to the final closing of his purchase of real property
within a conservation and reclamation district, and imposes harsh penalties for the seller's failure to provide such notice.

238. But see Tax. ATT'y GEN. Op. No. H-226 (1974) which concludes that portions
of such restrictions are unconstitutional.
239. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
240. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

241. See Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed, 79 CASE & COMMENT
3 (1974), for a thorough listing and review of these two cases in connection with vari-

ous forms of seizure practices. See also Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession
by Secured Creditors under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 HousTON L. REV. 855 (1973); Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Constitutionality of
Texas' Landlord Laws and Other Summary Procedures, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (1973);
Comment, Procedural Due Process: For Sale in Texas to the Highest Bidder?, 10
HOUSTON L. REV. 880 (1973); Comment, Due Process Evolution-Fuentes and the
Deed of Trust, 26 Sw. L.J. 876 (1972); Note, Garagemen's Liens-Procedural Due
Process, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 390 (1973); Recent Development, ConstitutionalLaw-Innkeeper's Lien, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 649 (1973).
242. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (1966).

243. For recommendations of similar notice procedures, see Cotaellesse, Nonjudicial

Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust: Some Problems of Notice, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 1085

(1971).
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of trust foreclosures are consummated pursuant to a private contractual arrangement (with article 3810 merely recognizing such contractual arrangement and not granting any forec:losure powers above those authorized in the
contract), they are not "clothed with the authority of state law" and do not
constitute "state action" sufficient to support federal jurisdiction. 24 4 Although certainly not applicable to all pre-judgment seizure practices, 245 these
two decisions may at least temporarily ameliorate the quandary of a deed
of trust creditor who does not wish to avoid "the law of foreclosure" but
who does wish, not unreasonably, to be given legislative or judicial guidance
246
as to what that law requires.
Personal Property. The six cases worthy of mention in the field of personal
property law involve finding lost goods, 2 4 7 bailment, 248 trover and conversion, 249 adverse possession, 250 eminent domain, 25' and escheat. 212 As
promised at the beginning of this Article, mention of these cases has been
scant.
Eminent Domain and Zoning. The cases listed in this section were originally designated for inclusion in a Survey article on local government.253 In
the absence of such an article in this year's Survey, they are referenced below. In the two supreme court decisions rendered during this survey year
involving questions of eminent domain, the court reviewed in depth only
procedural issues. 25 4 Lower courts also ruled on procedural issues, 25 5 as
244. Hoffman v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., Civil Action No.
CA-7-878 (N.D. Tex., Feb. 6, 1974); Leisure Estates of America, Inc. v. Carmel Dev.
Co., Civil Action No. 73-C-70 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 24, 1974).
245. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed supra at note 220,
and accompanying text. See also the authority cited at note 241 supra.
246. See Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the SniadachFuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 79 CASE & COMMENT 24 (1974).
247. Neal v. Kirkland, 486 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972) (in a case
involving $42,500 in currency unearthed while a contractor was digging a ditch, the
court reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment for further findings as to
whether one or more of the claimants were "owners" of the currency).
248. H.O. Dyer, Inc. v. Steele, 489 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1972) (the bailee, a parking lot owner, was held liable for damages when the
bailor's automobile was stolen from the lot, inasmuch as the jury found negligence on
the part of the bailee).
249. Masso v. Bryan, 498 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref.
n.r.e. (a $4,000 award for exemplary damages was affirmed in a case where the plaintiff proved malicious conversion of personal property and $4,200 actual damages).
250. Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ., 497 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), appeal
dismissed on other grounds, 501 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. 1973) (the court held that the plaintiff university had acquired title to valuable documents, which the defendants claimed
had merely been transferred to the university as a temporary custodian).
251. Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973) (the court determined
that when the state takes otherwise commonplace items of personal property which
have acquired unique value as collecto:'s items, the condemnation award should reflect
the enhanced value).
252. State v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 488 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972) (held that TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. article 3272a (1968) entitled the state
to retain not only funds owing on utility deposits and uncashed checks but also unclaimed preferred stock dividends).
253. See, e.g., Sullivan, Local Government, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 198, 203-04, 208-11 (1973).
254. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1973) (in which
the court rejected a collateral attack on a county court eminent domain proceeding);
Rose v. State, 497 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1973) (in which the court held that a county
court could entertain a bill of review and reform a prior award rendered on a mutual
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well as a river authority's power of condemnation, 2 6 and the validity of a
dedication deed in lieu of condemnation; 257 however, as usual the vast
majority of eminent domain cases evolved around the question of damages. 258 Zoning cases during the survey year were decided upon the following issues: whether a city has the authority wholly to exclude school facilities from its boundaries; 259 whether a city has authority to require that a
building permit for an apartment complex be conditioned upon the project's
financing not being insured by the Federal Housing Administration; 260 and
whether a public utility's power of eminent domain is superior to a city's
2 61
zoning ordinance.

mistake of fact). In the Sierra Club case the court's adherence to a procedural determination avoided a full analysis to determine when one political subdivision (in this
case, the Austin Independent School District) can condemn public land held by another
political subdivision (in this case, the city of Austin). This issue, however, was fully
reviewed in the lower court's opinion. Sierra Club v. Austin Ind. School Dist., 489
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), rev'd, 495 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1973).
255. Dickey v. City of Houston, 494 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973); Maberry v. Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc., 493 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin
1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. Earp, 487 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972); City of Beaumont v. West, 484 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
256. Brown v. Lower Colo. River Authority, 485 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1972).
257. State v. Keeton Packing Co., 487 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972), error ref. n.r.e. (the plaintiff, who during the trial apparently pursued only its
remedy for damages, alleged that the state's agent had misrepresented the state's intent
to construct a highway across the dedicated property).
258. Ansley v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One, 498
S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Hester v. State, 497 S.W.2d
501 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; City of Richardson v. Smith,
494 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Elec. Serv. Co.
v. Yater, 494 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; State v.
Capitol City Oil Co., 494 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973); Central Power
& Light Co. v. Martinez, 493 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973);
Church of the Nazarene v. County of Dallas, 493 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; State v. Buck, 489 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; State v. Adams, 489 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, 489 S.W.2d
148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Delhi Gas Pipeline Co. v.
Reid, 488 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Elec. Serv.
Co. v. Graves, 488 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Jefferson County v. Cohrt, 487 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972); Central
Power & Light Co. v. Wedig, 485 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972),
error ref. n.r.e.; Intratex Gas Co. v. Hilbun, 485 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1972).
259. City of Sunset Valley v. Austin Ind. School Dist., 488 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin), rev'd, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973).
260. Rhodes v. Shapiro, 494 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
261. Porter v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972), error ref. n.r.e.

